For the tentative ceasefire between Hamas and Israel to hold creative solutions must be adopted. The ceasefire agreement and hostage release agreed on by Hamas and Israel that came into effect on 19th January was brokered by the incoming Trump administration the day before the President returned to the White House[i] and provided a fragile respite from the war which commenced with Hamas’s brutal attack on Israel on 7th October 2023. The most recent ceasefire saw 25 living Israeli hostages released, in multiple stages, and the bodies of eight others, including a mother, Shiri Bibas and her two children[ii], returned. Five Thai hostages were also released.
This took place alongside the release of 1,900 Palestinian prisoners from Israeli jails[iii], many serving life sentences for terrorism.
After completing the first stage (temporary ceasefire) of the initial agreement, the process has now hit a standstill. Both sides blame each other of breaching the agreement and are not able to agree on the conditions for continuing to a permanent ceasefire.
Outside the box thinking is necessary if hostages are to be released and leaders are to keep the ceasefire alive and prevent yet another cycle of violence.
What is the immediate sticky point?
The release of Palestinian terrorists has been shown to spur additional waves of terrorism.
Israel calls for the immediate release of all hostages held by Hamas, while Hamas seeks the release of all Palestinian prisoners in Israeli custody. The first phase of the shaky ceasefire called for the release of 1,904 Palestinian security prisoners[iv], including the 737 offenders serving life terms for their crimes.
Israel’s predicament of releasing prisoners, especially those “with blood on their hands” in exchange for hostages is not a new one, with the problem remaining the same; The release of Palestinian terrorists has been shown to spur additional waves of terrorism.[v] Yahya Ibrahim Hassan Sinwar who served as chairman of the Hamas Political Bureau was released in a previous prisoner exchange only to mastermind the 7th October terrorist attacks on Israel.
Sinwar was released in 2011[vi] as part of the Corporal Shalit deal. Shin Bet reported 82% of those released in 2011 Shalit deal returned to terror activity, with 15% carrying out attacks themselves. Similar rounds of Israeli-Palestinian conflict have seen the same alarming trend.
Recidivism is a problem with prisoners around the word and especially acute one in cases of terrorism. This is a global problem from Guantanamo Bay Detainees to freed Boko Haram terrorists, far too many have walked out of jail and back into violent extremism.
Among the former it is worth nothing that according to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence in 2020 some 14.5% of released detainees were confirmed to have reengaged in terrorism, with an additional 17.1% likely to have reengaged in terrorism.[vii]
If the delicate road to a lasting arrangement between Israel and Hamas is to move forward, a fundamental shift in required in how prisoner releases are approached.
Proven De-Radicalization and Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) program must be examined. Relevant techniques must be integrated into the process as a means to at least trying to break the cycle of extremism and counter violent extremism in the future.
There are over a dozen countries, including Singapore, Saudi Arabia, Algeria and Egypt, the United Kingdom, the Philippines, France, Spain and Indonesia that have shown success with programs aimed at violent extremists.
Including both DDR programs and similar efforts that deradicalize violent extremisms before releasing them to become productive civilians in society.
The ideological nature of terrorism can only be countered with a similarly ideological approach and specifically, with the help of structured engagement with moderate Islamic scholars, theological discussions, and psychological counselling which can last a few years.
Saudi Arabia’s Munasaha Program[viii] has sought to engage former detainees in theological discussions with moderate Islamic scholars, psychological counselling, and reintegration support for those who complete the program and return to Saudi Arabia. The curriculum is similar for Morocco’s Moussalaha (reconciliation) program, which has graduated hundreds back into society at the completion of their program with no notable increase in terrorist activity since it was launched in 2017.[ix]
The case study of Singapore is a compelling model[x], having successfully rehabilitated members of Jama’ah Islamiyah. At its peak the group included cells in Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia and the Philippines. The Singaporean program involved some 60 participants, 40 of whom were deemed fit for release, and none of whom have returned to terrorism. Singapore’s system was the result of trial and error as the case of Chia Thye Poh – perhaps the longest serving political prisoner of the 20th century attests. Singapore’s success is notable amongst the ASEAN countries which engaged in such work because unlike the other countries it is neither Muslim-majority nor incorporates a Muslim-majority region as in the case of the Philippines.
Singaporean detainees who were released back into society highlighted the role of non-Muslims in their process of reintegration. According to one interviewed, “The people I once deemed kafir (infidels) and enemies of Islam were the source of my strength. The one who opened my eyes to true Islam was a non‑Muslim.”[xi] Some even highlighted the positive aspects of their incarceration expressing that they were fortunate to be detained as it prevented them from falling further into terrorism and committing further acts of violence.
Similar efforts could be adapted for Palestinian prisoners in different contexts. Key to this would be to establish such rehabilitation centres outside of the politically charged environment in which militants currently find themselves.
Such programs have their critics. However, similar efforts could be adapted for Palestinian prisoners in different contexts. Key to this would be to establish such rehabilitation centres outside of the politically charged environment in which militants currently find themselves. A part of this process in third-party countries could also include life skills, vocational, and business training. Additionally, it should involve direct engagement with extremist ideologies, highlighting their divergence from mainstream Sunni Islamic teachings.
A 2010 report from the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR) identifies the key underlying drivers and principles of individual disengagement and de-radicalisation programmes, which may help policymakers understand the phenomenon and identify elements of best practice. In this case drawing on the experience of fifteen countries. In the Israeli case the report posited that, “Israel’s ability to significantly de-radicalize security prisoners is limited if it is at all existent in its current form. Security prisoners with the potential for positive change should be placed in a different, perhaps foreign setting.”[xii]
It is in such foreign environments that former militants would have the chance to be exposed to new narratives and a new outlook on life. Such an approach would work best alongside vocational training which could better prepare them for reintegration. Success would be impossible without international involvement in both funding and the execution of this delicate process. The involvement of the European Union, the Gulf States and perhaps United States would assist in ensuring credibility and effectiveness of such programs.
At the heart of this extremely complex issue lies a simple reality: peace cannot be achieved through short-term political calculations. The delay in the release of Palestinian prisoners in exchange for hostages underscores the fragility of the current ceasefire agreement.
Israel and Hamas continue to trade accusations of violating the agreement while mediators scramble to salvage the process. The success of Singapore, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Egypt, the United Kingdom, the Philippines, France, Spain, and Indonesia in exactly such programs must be drawn upon.
The release of hostages and the ceasefire risk following the pattern of previous failed attempts, perpetuating another cycle of conflict in the region. This must be avoided. A new straightforward approach must be proposed, according to which Palestinian prisoners would be transferred to de-radicalization programs in multiple countries, ensuring their ideological rehabilitation, in return for the immediate and unconditional release of all Israeli hostages. This approach offers a bold, all-encompassing solution, breaking the cycle of violence in a single, irreversible step.
[i] Tondo, L., McKernan, B. and Beaumont, P. (2025). “Gaza ceasefire begins with release of three Israeli hostages”, The Guardian, 19 January 2025, retrieved from: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/jan/19/gaza-fighting-ceasefire-delay-israel-hamas-hostage-list-dispute.
[ii] Lukiv, J. (2025). “Israel confirms Shiri Bibas body has been returned”, BBC News, 21 February 2025, retrieved from: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cjw20d3l4jpo.
[iii] Seddon, S.(2025). “Israel says bodies of four hostages returned, as freed Palestinian prisoners arrive in West Bank”, BBC News, 26 February 2025, retrieved from: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/live/cm2n973y2ext.
[iv] Fabian, E. (2025). “Israel to free up to 1,904 Palestinians in 1st stage of hostage deal, including killers”, The Times of Israel, 18 January 2025, retrieved from: https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-to-free-1904-palestinians-in-1st-stage-of-hostage-deal-including-killers/.
[v] Campbell, M. (2025). “ ‘Israel thinks it’s buried us’—but freed Palestinians have other ideas”, The Times, 25 January 2025, retrieved from: https://www.thetimes.com/world/middle-east/israel-hamas-war/article/freed-palestinians-are-a-symbol-of-hope-but-is-there-danger-too-w0pqzjvsv.
[vi] Nakhoul, S. (2024). “Yahya Sinwar Hamas’ hunted leader, remains committed to Israel’s destruction”, Reuters, 17 October 2024, retrieved from: https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hunted-yet-unrepentant-yahya-sinwar-remains-committed-israels-destruction-2024-10-04/.
[vii] Office of the Director of National Intelligence (2020). “Summary of the Reengagement of Detainees Formerly Held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba”, 18 December 2020, retrieved from: https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/reports-publications/reports-publications-2020/3529-summary-of-the-reengagement-of-detainees-formerly-held-at-guantanamo-bay-cuba-1692377374.
[viii] Castptack, A. (2015). “Deradicalization Programs in Saudi Arabia: A Case Study”, Middle East Institute, 10 June 2015, retrieved from: https://www.mei.edu/publications/deradicalization-programs-saudi-arabia-case-study.
[ix] Kasraoui, S. (2022). “Moussalaha: Morocco Renews Stance Against Terror Threats, Extremism”, Morocco World News, 29 April 2022, retrieved from: https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2022/04/46812/moussalaha-morocco-renews-stance-against-terror-threats-extremism/.
[x] Jayakumar, S. and Pantucci, R. (2020). “The Singapore Model: A New Deradicalisation Approach for the UK?”, Royal United Services Institute, 13 March 2020, retrieved from: https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/rusi-newsbrief/singapore-model-new-deradicalisation-approach-uk.
[xi] Jayakumar, S. (2020). “Deradicalisation in Singapore: Past, Present and Future”, International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, retrieved from: https://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/ICSR-Report-Deradicalisation-in-Singapore-Past-Present-and-Future.pdf.
[xii] Ganor, B. et al. (2013). “De-Radicalization in Israel’s Prison System”, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 1 February 2013.
