Sunday, 8thDecember 2024 is a date that Syrians will never forget. Just after midnight, Bashar Assad escaped the country, drawing a dramatic end to the Assad dynasty, which ruled Syria for more than half a century. The collapse of the regime closes the chapter of fourteen years of bloody war that killed more than 600,000 people, displaced half of the Syrian population, and transferred the country into a battlefield for various state and non-state actors. Certainly, the toppling of Assad marks a new era in Syria and in the region as it indicates an unprecedented shift in the balance of power, a shift that would be as significant as the 1979 Khomeini-led revolution in Iran, and the 1987 fall of the Berlin war.
Pictures and videos of scenes coming out of Damascus late Saturday night 7th December displaying regime forces taking off their military outfit, leaving behind their tanks and guns, and running for their lives while on the other side of the highway, armed rebels were entering the areas shocked Syrians and state officials around the world. There was no confrontation or resistance. The picture looked as if soldiers were on rotation to take over a new shift. This rapid and swift collapse of the Assad regime put forward many questions.
Why now, how did this happen and what is next?
Syrians are still trying to understand the new reality they woke up to while observers are contemplating the timing, logistics, and the aftermath of Assad’s fall.
The main question is why now, after a decade of war and years of political stalemate. The answer lies in the geopolitical context in which Syria is situated. Shifts in the regional alliance structure triggered by Israel’s military operations in the Gaza Strip and in Lebanon are the primary factor behind the timing. The wars have decapitated the leadership of both Hamas and Hezbollah, and dealt a significant blow to the organizational and military capabilities of both militant groups, leading to a demise of Iranian influence in Syria too and a consequent shift in Russian support to the Assad regime.
The Syrian Revolution of 2011, which started as a peaceful movement for civil rights and turned into a multilayered struggle for power between various state and non-state actors, reached a stalemate in 2016 after the so-called comprehensive agreements sponsored by Russia and Turkey divided Syria into areas of influence. According to these agreements, Northeastern areas are controlled by the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), supported by the United States. Northwest Syria on the other hand is divided between the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). In the South of the country, Daraa province witnessed localized truces allowing former rebels to keep their light weapons.
From 2016 to late November 2024, lines of delineation on this map have not witnessed any major revisions. Yet, after the Israeli-Hezbollah war and the determination to erase Iranian presence in Lebanon and Syria, the balance of power shifted radically. In this vein, Turkey and Russia intended to protect their interests and redraw the rules of the game before the arrival of the new U.S. administration, and neither would risk a long-term power vacuum in Syria.
In a major development on 28th November, HTS launched operation Deter the Aggression[i] in cooperation with the SNA, and in a matter of eleven days took over major Syrian cities like Aleppo, Hama, Homs, and eventually reached the presidential palace in Damascus.
On the battlefield, three factors were behind this swift victory. First and foremost, neither Russian jets nor Hezbollah fighters were present. Their military intervention was vital for the Assad regime’s survival throughout the conflict. Secondly, regime forces lacked the motivation to fight back, and instead of resisting, they chose to flee. Lastly, a critical factor is that most rebels are displaced Syrians, who were evacuated from their towns and cities in 2012, and were driven by a powerful source of motivation to return.
HTS and SNA: a new partnership?
HTS and the SNA were fighting for domination over the north of Syria for many years. Although both have an explicit Islamic character, they differ in agendas and ideologies. HTS, which was previously known as Al-Nusra Front, is led by Abu Mohammed al-Jolani[ii], a 42-year-old man born to a Syrian family in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. He grew up in Damascus and later fought in Iraq under the umbrella of al-Qaeda. Al-Jolani succeeded in toppling Assad in less than two weeks and became the de facto ruler of Syria.
Al-Jolani changed his discourse and style over the years, and moved from wearing head-to-toe black Islamic outfit and being referred to as Al-Fateh (meaning liberator), to becoming an al-Qaeda leader who appeared on foreign media platforms wearing a blazer and speaking about the role of governance and education. With the start of the military operation, Al-Jolani began using his real name, Ahmad al-Sharaa, and wearing a Zelinsky-style green uniform while talking to western media about state building and chatting with Syrians about the new, inclusive Syria. He is branding himself in front of the Syrian people as well as western governments as a leader leaning toward modernization. He told a CNN reporter in Damascus that HTS is only a tool to overthrow the regime, and it will be dissolved in the future.[iii]
Interestingly, for the first time since the outset of the conflict, various Syrian actors such as HTS, the SNA, and militias from the South of the country cooperated to reach Damascus. Although they were not fighting under the same umbrella of an inclusive opposition army, this denotes a shift towards pragmatism. Ironically, the Assad regime who relied on realpolitik for 54 years seems has come to be overthrown by it.
Tyranny out, Jihadis in?
There are justified fears of an Islamic takeover of Syria, given the explicit Islamic character of the rebels. Although pictures of soldiers with long beards waving Salafi flags in the street while chanting Islamic slogans dominate the scene in Syria today, a Taliban-style government is unlikely to appear for multiple reasons. The primary reason for this is the social and demographic composition of Syrian society, which is heterogeneous in nature and includes many sectarian identity groups. Secondly, many of the fighters have been radicalized as a result of the conflict inside Syria and there is hope that they can be deradicalized once the war is over and the objectives of their leadership change. Lastly, and most importantly, Syria occupies a geopolitical position in which an Islamist takeover would trigger backlash from most bordering countries. This can potentially serve as an external limitation on the chosen tactics of the HTS leadership.
Challenges and Opportunities
Assad’s defeat is a historical and jubilant moment for countless Syrians. Yet, there are myriad challenges facing the new leadership. These include internal challenges such as rebuilding the Syrian army and assimilating rebels, protecting governmental institutions, implementing constitutional reforms, rebuilding the national concord, and reconstructing national symbols, flags, and the currency. Forming a solid national unity and erasing the lines of exclusion that were drawn by the regime will be crucial. Interestingly, despite fears of sectarian clashes and tit-for-tat revenge between Sunnis and Alawites, no sectarian clashes have been reported across the country, even in highly charged areas like Foua and Kefraya, which witnessed sectarian clashes in 2014, or Christian towns like Muhrada in North Hama. This provides hope sectarianism was manipulated for realpolitik’s ends and co-existence in Syria is indeed possible.
Today, Syria is at a crossroads with a golden opportunity for state- and nation-building that the country has not had since the creation of modern Syria in 1947, when military coups and Ba’athist domination hijacked its future. The collapse of the Assad regime also brought about the collapse of what was dubbed as the ‘kingdom of fear’. 8th December yielded a great opportunity for Syrians to build the third republic.
[i] The New Arab (2024). “’Deter the Aggression’: What is behind the new rebel offensive in northwest Syria?”, 28 November 2024, retrieved from: https://www.newarab.com/news/what-behind-new-rebel-offensive-northwest-syria.
[ii] Haltiwanger, J. (2024). “What to Know About the Man Who Toppled Assad”, Foreign Policy, 11 December, retrieved from: https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/12/11/syria-rebel-leader-jolani-hts-al-qaeda-islamic-state-isis/.
[iii] CNN World (2024). “Syrian rebel leaders peaks to CNN in exclusive interview”, 6 December, retrieved from: https://edition.cnn.com/2024/12/06/world/video/abu-mohammad-al-jolani-syria-rebel-leader-karadsheh-digvid.