Turkey chose a middle ground when Russia launched its full-scale invasion against Ukraine in 2022. The Turkish government condemned the aggression and declared its support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity, but refused to apply any sanctions on Russia and welcomed thousands of Russian immigrants and businesses into its territory. What’s more, Turkey now serves as an important trade destination for Russia when it comes to delivering sanctioned Western goods—reselling dual-use military items and other products from the US and the EU to the Kremlin. All of this is taking place while Ankara tries to mediate peace between Kyiv and Moscow.
This balancing position is not new in Russia-Turkey relations, which have often oscillated between rivalry or useful partnership, whichever suited both countries. Illustrating this is that in the past ten years, relations between Turkey and Russia ranged from aggressive public rhetoric and tensions nearly escalating to military confrontation, to extremely friendly terms and an enthusiastic bilateral partnership. Turkey sees Russia as an important neighbour, and yet it has got other, richer and more influential neighbours and partners, most notably including the EU and Gulf countries.
Not too close, not too far
“Both Turkey and Russia are ruled by leaders who can single-handedly and abruptly change their current policies,”[i] says Emre Kizilkaya, editor of the Istanbul-based non-profit journalism platform, Journo.
Kizilkaya, who studies media and communications, believes that both Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Russia’s Vladimir Putin perceive each other as significant partners, and make sure not to alienate one another too much. Turkey’s response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine can be seen in this light, as Erdoğan’s approach allowed balancing between the two countries by supplying Ukraine with military drones while appeasing Putin in other policy areas, including within NATO.
“However, as Erdoğan needs Western investments and financial support to improve his country’s ruined economy, it seems that Putin has recently been alarmed by Turkey’s pragmatic interests in closer relations with the West, which can signal more trouble in the coming weeks,” Kizilkaya added.
However, Turkey’s balancing between Russia and Ukraine—and the ability to maintain good relations with both—stems from a lasting historical tradition and is not the invention of Erdoğan alone. Istanbul was a refuge for Russian émigrés in the 1920s[ii], and Turkey was one of the first countries to recognize the Ukrainian People’s Republic in 1917 and then Ukraine’s independence in 1991.[iii]
“Cultural exchange and intermarriage created a familiarity between people, and neither Russians’ nor Ukrainians’ public image in Turkey has been negative,” Kizilkaya continued. “As a result, despite their large numbers, we do not observe any anti-immigrant sentiment among Turks against Russians or Ukrainians, in contrast to what we see with Syrian refugees.”
Trade for mutual benefits
Due to Turkey’s middle position amid the Russo-Ukrainian war, Russia’s rhetoric toward Turkey was drastically different to the one directed toward EU countries. Turkey was presented as a neutral ground for potential peace negotiations with Ukraine, which did not bear any results. Turkey was, however, able to negotiate a “grain initiative” between Russia and Ukraine, which allowed Ukrainian agricultural companies to transport wheat through the Black Sea despite Russian occupation of the coastal areas after 2022.[iv]
As Turkey did not apply any sanctions on Russia in 2022, it continued trading with the country as usual, as well as kept trading with the Western world.
Turkey’s opportunities to play a mediating role in these agreements also stems from the country’s importance for Russia as a source of Western products—especially sanctioned goods. As Turkey did not apply any sanctions on Russia in 2022, it continued trading with the country as usual, as well as kept trading with the Western world. Thanks to a “no-sanctions policy”[v], Turkey’s trade with Russia surged in 2023, although it prompted the US to warn Turkey of having to face potential sanctions itself if it continues facilitating trade to Russia.
Additionally, Turkey increased its import of Russian energy and started reselling it to the EU, allowing Russia to earn about $3 billion while Turkey was technically abiding by the EU sanctions. In 2023, Turkey increased its purchase of Russian fuel products by 105% in comparison to 2022[vi]; and it also increased its fuel exports to the EU by 107%. The fuel that Turkey sold to the EU was still Russian, but as a middleman Turkey traded with Europe legally.[vii]
Little media conflicts
Unlike trade, where Turkey and Russia found mutual benefits, the media and information spheres remain an area with the most potential for a conflict between the two, according to a study published in September 2023 by the Centre for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies[viii], an Istanbul-based independent think-tank. The report states that “Russia, known for its expertise in information warfare, has been particularly active in disinformation campaigns in Turkey”, and that it “has been trying to shape the discourse about Turkey’s military intervention in Syria and its relations with other actors.” According to the research, pro-Kremlin media and Kremlin-affiliated social media bots were spreading manipulated and false content to promote anti-Turkish sentiments and undermine Turkey’s role in the region—such as painting Ankara’s actions in Syria in a negative light.
“Russia’s information warfare in Turkey is evolving with the changing conditions,” said Kizilkaya. For instance, Russia’s state-owned news outlet Sputnik Türkiye hired critical journalists after Moscow’s relationship with Turkey soured when Ankara shot down a Russian military aircraft.[ix] After bilateral relations improved, Sputnik Türkiye fired those journalists and largely stopped reporting critically about Ankara’s policies.[x] A similar trend can be observed in Russia-controlled bot and troll networks on social media.
For now, Russia needs Turkey more than the other way around.
Overall, Russia does not have a grip over Turkey—so bilateral relations are dictated by the needs of both countries, and not solely based on Russia’s desires. The Kremlin has to adjust to the Turkish leadership’s policy preferences to an extent, and it does not target Turkey as much as its Western neighbours in its misinformation campaigns.
In addition, Erdoğan’s ambiguous rhetoric toward Europe—which, too, changes depending on Ankara’s needs—makes Turkey a situational partner for Russia on different occasions. Turkey, however, does not see Russia as its most important ally or partner.
“Turkey’s traditional foreign policy based on balance has dramatically changed with Erdoğan overall, apart from a few exceptions,” Kizilkaya concluded. “Turkey tries to strike that balance instead of investing all its chips on one side between the West and Russia. In this context, Erdoğan’s sometimes surprising moves, so far, have been more temporary adjustments than long-term fixes.”
For now, Russia needs Turkey more than the other way around—both in terms of trade, but also to avoid further diplomatic isolation. The Turkish government may choose to benefit from this even more—keeping the economic partnership afloat while strengthening other, more important, relations with different global players elsewhere.
[i] Based on a personal interview with Emre Kizilkaya.
[ii] Lykova, Y. (2007). “Russian Emigration to Turkey in the 1920s: A Case Study”, Journal of the Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, 25(1), 323-341, retrieved from: https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/download/article-file/307614#:~:text=At%20the%20same%20time%20around,from%20200%20000%20in%201921.
[iii] Republic of Turkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2024). “Relations between Turkiye and Ukraine”, retrieved from: https://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-ukraine.en.mfa.
[iv] Wintour, P. (2023). “What was the Black Sea grain deal and why did it collapse?”, The Guardian, 20 July 2023, retrieved from: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jul/20/what-was-the-black-sea-grain-deal-and-why-did-it-collapse.
[v] Kefalogiannus, M. (2022). “Turkey’s refusal to go along with sanctions on Russia and its transformation into a Russian ‘transit hub’”, European Parliament, 25 October 2022, retrieved from: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-9-2022-003495_EN.html.
[vi] Jack, V. (2024). “How Turkey became Putin’s ‘pit stop’ for selling camouflaged fuel to the EU”, Politico, 15 May 2024, retrieved from: https://www.politico.eu/article/how-turkey-become-vladimir-putin-pit-stop-sell-camouflage-fuel-eu/.
[vii] Vladimirov, M. (2024). „Europe Must Clamp Down on Russian Oil Flows Through Turkey“, Project Syndicate, 19 July 2024, retrieved from: https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/eu-must-stop-inflows-of-russian-oil-through-turkey-by-martin-vladimirov-2024-07.
[viii] Unver, A. (2023). “Advanced Technologies, Information Manipulation, and Disinformation”, edam, retrieved from: https://edam.org.tr/Uploads/Yukleme_Resim/pdf-12-09-2023-00-15-18.pdf.
[ix] BBC News (2015). „Turkey’s downing of Russian warplane – what we know“, 1 December 2015, retrieved from: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-34912581.
[x] Donmez Ersoz, B. (2019). “Sputnik Drops Journalists after Interview with Erdogan Rival”, VOA, 29 July 2019, retrieved from: https://www.voanews.com/a/middle-east_sputnik-drops-journalists-after-interview-erdogan-rival/6172847.html.
