Russia’s strategy in MENA garners marginal returns in public opinion

Unsurprisingly, favorable views of Russia and support for its invasion of Ukraine covary: Among those who view Russia favorably, the percentage of citizens who support the invasion of Ukraine is significantly higher than those who oppose it. Yet notably, across surveyed countries there are nonetheless significant percentages of citizens who hold favorable views of Russia but not its war.

The ways in which Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have impacted the economic[ii] and geopolitical[iii] landscape of the MENA region have been widely documented. Globally, and particularly for non-GCC MENA region countries, supply chain disruptions to wheat in particular sent food prices skyrocketing.[iv] The Food Security Information Network’s 2023 Global Report on Food Crises[v] noted that in Lebanon, 33 percent of Lebanese residents and 46 percent of Syrian refugees faced crisis levels of food insecurity. In the Palestinian Territories, 53 percent of the Gaza Strip’s population and 11 percent of the West Bank’s population were acutely food insecure. Tunisia and Morocco[vi], while not among the list of countries with major food crises in 2022, were nonetheless hit hard by the rising prices of imports of food (and energy): both countries saw increases in their account deficits fueled primarily by widening energy and agriculture trade deficits. Tunisia’s account deficit rose to just under 10 percent, up from 6 percent in 2021, and Morocco’s rose to 4 percent, up from 2 percent in the previous year. By all accounts, such consequences in these four countries were directly—though not exclusively—related to the war in Ukraine.

While global food prices had receded to pre-war levels by December 2022, the UN’s Food and Agricultural Organization 2023 report on the State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World[vii] nonetheless suggests that the ripple effects of Russia’s war will last well into the future. This is particularly true for lower-middle income countries and lower income countries that are disproportionally adversely affected by rising prices.[viii]

Food insecurity continues to be a significant challenge for the MENA region, with 2024 Arab Barometer data revealing that majorities in Jordan, Lebanon, Mauritania, Morocco, Palestine, and Tunisia report that they often or sometimes ran out of food before having money to buy more. Yet, when asked what the primary cause of food insecurity is, most citizens in surveyed countries point to government mismanagement as the root cause, followed by inflation. Across all six countries, fewer than one in five citizens say the biggest cause of food insecurity is the war in Ukraine, and the highest shares of citizens attributing food-related problems to the war are in Tunisia (18 percent) and Morocco (12 percent). While the interruption of grain supplies is directly linked to inflation, publics do not primarily or exclusively attribute it to the fallout of Russia’s war.

Instead, and as has been said of official state positions particularly in the Gulf, the view that the war in Ukraine is “somebody else’s issue”[ix] seems largely applicable to public opinion in countries surveyed as part of Arab Barometer’s eighth wave. There are more pressing or more proximate crises both domestically and regionally that garner more concern among citizens, though none so as much as the most recent crisis in the Gaza Strip.

Russia has adopted a neutral stance on the war in Gaza, leveraging it as part of both regional and domestic strategies.[x] Moscow’s most recent overtures to the Palestinian cause have been embroiled in its larger attempts to position itself against the U.S.[xi] in the MENA region and frame its actions in Ukraine in an ironic pursuit of a moral high ground.[xii] Yet despite its historical and most recent attempts[xiii], Russia’s posturing on Palestine has had few reverberations thus far in MENA public opinion, both before and after 7^th October 2023.

At 29 percent, the share of citizens who have a favorable view of Russia in Palestine, where Arab Barometer survey fielding concluded on 6^th October, is the lowest of any country surveyed this wave. Even in Tunisia, where Russia’s favorability is highest, Russia’s posturing on Gaza in the aftermath of 7^th October seems to have had little effect on Tunisian public opinion. An extensive analysis[xiv] conducted by Arab Barometer’s research team revealed that favorability towards Russia did not change in Tunisia in the month following Israel’s attack, despite the country hosting a visit by Russian President Vladimir Putin for the first time since the war in Ukraine began. Based on mean estimates from a line best fitted to three-day rolling averages of public opinion, 56 percent of Tunisians favorably viewed Russia prior to 7^th October while 53 percent held the same view after it, a change that is statistically insignificant.

Elsewhere in the region, fewer than one in five citizens in each Morocco (17 percent), Lebanon (15 percent), Kuwait (14 percent), Jordan (6 percent), and Mauritania (5 percent) say they believe that Russia is one of the parties committed to defending Palestinian rights, and equally small shares of citizens across these countries believe it is committed to defending Israeli rights. Despite Moscow’s efforts to position itself as a possible broker to the conflict, only 19 percent of citizens in Morocco, 12 percent in Kuwait, and 8 percent in each Mauritania, Lebanon, and Jordan believe Russia is suited to mediate a fair political solution. As such, Moscow’s attempt to use the war in Gaza to position itself against the U.S. is not working if only because MENA publics seem at best uncertain and at worst dubious of what Russia’s stance on the war is.

Instead, the gains Russia has made in favorability in Tunisia and Morocco and the relative stasis of opinions towards it in Jordan, Lebanon, and Palestine suggest that citizens’ views are potentially being mediated through country-specific bilateral agreements or through uneasiness about other regional alliances Russia is trying to forge. Russia’s effort to position itself alongside China and Iran as a counterweight to American influence in MENA seems to have few if any of its desired effects on public opinion.

While Russia’s military- and energy-driven policy focus does not directly compete[xv] with China’s focus on economic development in the region, Moscow’s most recent efforts in North Africa suggest an attempt to vie for political influence through economic cooperation[xvi], particularly in the area of food security: in 2023, Russia became actively more involved in supplying wheat to both Morocco and Tunisia. This may explain why the percentage of citizens who want to strengthen economic relations with Russia increased to 43 percent in Morocco and 73 percent in Tunisia, representing 15- and 21-point increases, respectively, between 2022 and 2024. Elsewhere, citizens’ desires to strengthen relations remained relatively unchanged.

Yet the efficacy of Moscow’s economic efforts in North Africa should not be overstated. Changes in desire to strengthen economic relations with external powers tend to be confounded by citizens’ overarching openness to globalization. Findings from Arab Barometer surveys reveal that, with few exceptions, trend lines tend to fluctuate in tandem: that is, citizens’ desires to strengthen economic relations with various foreign countries tend to rise, fall, or remain constant across the set of foreign countries rather than to see desires to strengthen ties with one country drastically rise and with another country drastically fall. Instead, what changes is the degree to which preferences rise and fall (that is, the percentage point increase or decrease between any two years).

Desires to strengthen economic ties with each Russia and China fit this pattern. Only in Tunisia does the desire to strengthen economic ties with Russia increase more drastically than the desire to strengthen economic ties with China. And across surveyed countries, the share of citizens who want to strengthen economic relations with China is higher than the share who want to do the same with Russia.