The movement against authoritarian leaders in the Middle East and North Africa known as the Arab Spring started in Tunisia and led to the downfall of long-time Tunisian dictator Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in January 2011.[i] A Constituent Assembly was freely elected in October 2011.[ii] The democratic system that ensued had to face manifold political and economic crises. None of them, however, was as serious as Tunisian President Kais Saied’s power grab in July 2021, after which most democratic freedoms were suspended.
Mohamed Zayani, a professor of Critical Theory at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar, has edited “A Fledgling Democracy: Tunisia in the Aftermath of the Arab Uprisings”, a volume that explores Tunisia’s democratic transition and its challenges. There is no single explanation to understand why Tunisia transitioned to democracy whereas other Arab countries did not. In her chapter of the edited volume, Wilson Center scholar Marina Ottaway argues the absence of a deep state – in contrast to countries such as Algeria and Egypt – was a key factor, added to the fact that Tunisia “was politically pluralistic, although it was fairly homogenous in terms of ethnicity and religion.” [iii]
The moderation of the Muslim Brotherhood’s branch in Tunisia, the Ennahda party, also played an important role. In the post-Ben Ali period, and despite considerable internal resistance, Ennahda consolidated itself as a democratic liberal party. The significance of its political activity moved from “ideological (social and political transformation) to post-ideological (technocratic management of public affairs).”[iv] Furthermore, the denunciation of Salafism by Ennahda’s leader Rached Ghannouchi greatly contributed to the political institutionalization of the party.[v]
[...] An important volume to understand the major changes experienced by Tunisia after 2011, but also the continuities in the country’s political and economic system.
The establishment of a democratic system in Tunisia resulted in the emergence of a vibrant public life with the creation of 5,000 Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in the first two years after the revolution.[vi] Although CSOs were not necessarily pro-democratic, they appear to “have been crucial in both building and maintaining democracy in the post-revolutionary period.”[vii]
“A Fledgling Democracy” is an important volume to understand the major changes experienced by Tunisia after 2011, but also the continuities in the country’s political and economic system. The French colonial presence in Tunisia favored the economic development of the eastern coastal regions, to the detriment of the western and southern areas of the country. The first leader of independent Tunisia, Habib Bourguiba, and later on Ben Ali after overthrowing Bourguiba in a soft coup in 1987, accentuated these disparities with their economic policies.[viii] Although no one could have reasonably expected the new democracy to rapidly correct a tendency that was more than a century old, many were still disappointed with the slow pace of reforms.
After 2011, the continuous revolts in the interior regions of Tunisia reflected “the enduring structural violence of uneven development in transitional Tunisia.”[ix] A study of the 2016-2020 National Development Plan demonstrates that coastal governorates such as Tunis and Sfax received larger public funds from the government than more disadvantaged governorates. They also had a considerably higher completion rate of public projects.[x] Given this context, in frontier regions of western and southern Tunisia “many consider smuggling a regional right, a marginal form of accumulation that ensures regional survival.” [xi]
Tunisia’s poorest governorates have often been seen by the central government and coastal elites as hotbeds for radicalism. In this sense, Ruth Hanau Santini’s chapter in the edited volume, based on the field research she conducted in Ben Gardane, is highly illustrative. Ben Gardane is a town located around 30 km away (20 miles) from the Tunisian-Libyan border. In 2016, a group of 50 militants of the Islamic State (IS) coming from Libya attempted to take over the city by force. Security forces and local citizens coordinated to thwart the IS attack. The events, which came to be known as the ‘battle of Ben Gardane’, were seen by the mainstream media and political elites in Tunis as a certain “moral and social ‘redemption’” for a region they have traditionally considered suspect.[xii] However, the local perception documented by Hanau Santini is that no redemption was needed in the first place. Although some of the IS attackers were from Ben Gardane, the town had always largely opposed this radicalism.
Not only regional inequalities but also the continuous protests over socioeconomic demands—with an increased degree of organization after 2018—demonstrated that “political liberties alone did not suffice and that social justice was a crucial part of expectations from democracy.” [xiii] The distrust for traditional parties increased, and different authors in the volume identify this discontentment as key to understanding the election of Saied—a political outsider—as president in October 2019 and his power-grab in July 2021.[xiv]
Distrust for traditional parties increased, and different authors in the volume identify this discontentment as key to understanding the election of Saied.
Ottaway writes that Tunisia traded “formal democracy for failure to carry out the substantive reforms many of its citizens expected.”[xv] These words are particularly relevant when considering the turn of events in Tunisia since the election of Saied. When campaigning for president, he presented himself as someone who could facilitate reforms while remaining committed to democracy.[xvi] Then, in July 2021, Saied dismissed Prime Minister Hechim Mechichi and forced the closure of parliament. He justified his power grab by invoking Article 80 of the Constitution, which allows the president to introduce extraordinary measures to deal with an “imminent danger” to the country. [xvii]
A comprehensive work with first-class scholarship that covers Tunisia’s last decade from different angles in little more than 200 pages.
The economic context had significantly worsened since his election, in great part due to the Covid-19 pandemic, and Saied declared he needed more power to bring the country back to its feet. The move was initially welcomed by broad segments of society although Saied’s claim to be acting in accordance with the constitution rang hollow. If he had been able to use Article 80, that was because, due to political infighting, the Constitutional Court supposed to check the president’s power had never been established after the approval of the constitution in 2014.[xviii]
“A Fledgling Democracy” is a comprehensive work with first-class scholarship that covers Tunisia’s last decade from different angles in little more than 200 pages. Although Zayani mentions in the prologue that the transitional process has been severely affected by “the difficulty of achieving transitional justice and reconciling the country with its troubling past”, the reader would probably have welcomed a specific chapter on transitional justice. Mariam Salehi’s recent book “Transitional Justice in Process”, or her journal article on the topic, are valuable resources to understand the stalling of transitional justice, which preceded Saied’s 2019 election. [xix]
Close to two years after Saied’s power grab, the country finds itself in protracted conversations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to secure a deal that would avoid Tunisia’s financial collapse in exchange for austerity measures.[xx] Saied’s popularity is at record-low levels, and he appears more isolated than ever after his racist remarks regarding Sub-Saharan migrants and accusing political opponents of conspiracy for meeting Western diplomats.[xxi] On April 17, 2023, the police arrested Rached Ghannouchi, Saied’s most prominent political adversary, and raided the headquarters of the Ennahda party.[xxii] As we have seen, Tunisia’s democracy was far from perfect. However, it kept open avenues for change such as CSOs, street demonstrations, and free political participation that are now closed.
[i] Angelique Chrisafis and Ian Black, “Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali forced to flee Tunisia as protesters claim victory,” The Guardian, January 15, 2011, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jan/14/tunisian-president-flees-country-protests.
[ii] Al-Jazeera, “Final Tunisian election results announced,” November 14, 2011, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2011/11/14/final-tunisian-election-results-announced.
[iii] Marina Ottaway, “The Tunisian Transition and Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Democracy Is up to the Citizens, Not the Neighbors,” in A Fledgling Democracy: Tunisia in the Aftermath of the Arab Uprisings, edited by Mohamed Zayani (New York: Oxford University Press, 2022), p. 39.
[iv] Fabio Merone, “Post-Islamism Politics in Tunisia: Ennahda’s Evolution since the Revolution,” in Ibid., p. 89.
[v] Hanna Pfeifer, “The Normative Power of Secularism. Tunisian Ennahda’s Discourse on Religion, Politics, and the State (2011–2016),” Politics and Religion 12 (2019): 495-496.
[vi] Zuzana Hudáková, “Tunisia’s Re-Invigorated Civil Society: Changes and Challenges,” in A Fledgling Democracy, p. 111.
[vii] Ibid., p. 126.
[viii] Alexandra Domike Blackman, “What Can Tunisia’s Past Tell Us About Its Future? Critical Junctures and Political Trends,” in Ibid., p. 208.
[ix] Alyssa Miller, “The Violence of Endurance: Youth Precarity and Social Justice in Inner Tunisia,” in Ibid., p. 153.
[x] Manel Dridi, “Tunisia Facing Increasing Poverty and Regional Inequalities,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 26, 2021, https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/85654.
[xi] Alyssa Miller, “The Violence of Endurance: Youth Precarity and Social Justice in Inner Tunisia,” in A Fledgling Democracy, p. 159.
[xii] Ruth Hanau Santini, “Changing Security Dynamics in Tunisia: Reconsidering the Battle for Ben Gardane,” in Ibid., p. 179.
[xiii] Irene Weipert-Fenner, “Mobilization in Tunisia Post-2011: From Political Protests to National Campaign Movements,” in Ibid., p. 130.
[xiv] Miller, “The Violence of Endurance: Youth Precarity and Social Justice in Inner Tunisia,” in Ibid., p. 153; Weipert-Fenner, “Mobilization in Tunisia Post-2011: From Political Protests to National Campaign Movements,” in Ibid., p. 140.
[xv] Marina Ottaway, “The Tunisian Transition and Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Democracy Is up to the Citizens, Not the Neighbors,” in Ibid., p. 33.
[xvi] Sudarsan Raghavan, “In a blow to its political elites, a modest law professor is set to become Tunisia’s next president”, The Washington Post, October 13, 2019. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/as-tunisians-vote-in-presidential-runoff-a-political-outsider-is-certain-to-win/2019/10/13/8427d328-eb95-11e9-a329-7378fbfa1b63_story.html.
[xvii] Deutsche Welle, “Tunisia’s president appoints new government amid coup fears”, October 11, 2021. https://www.dw.com/en/tunisia-president-appoints-new-government-amid-coup-allegations/a-59472779.
[xviii] Tarek Megerisi, “Tunisia Coup: What Europeans Can Do to Save North Africa’s Only Democracy,” European Council on Foreign Relations, July 26, 2021, https://ecfr.eu/article/tunisia-coup-what-europeans-can-do-to-save-north-africas-only-democracy/.
[xix] Mariam Salehi, Transitional Justice in Process: Plans and Politics in Tunisia (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2022); Mariam Salehi, “Trying Just Enough or Promising Too Much? The Problem-Capacity-Nexus in Tunisia’s Transitional Justice Process,” Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 16, no. 1 (2022): 98–116.
[xx] Chao Deng, “IMF, World Bank Pause Loans to Tunisia Amid Crackdown on Migrants,” The Wall Street Journal, March 9, 2023, https://www.wsj.com/articles/imf-world-bank-pause-loans-to-tunisia-amid-crackdown-on-migrants-b683d08f.
[xxi] Rayhan Uddin, “Tunisia President Warns of Sub-Saharan Immigration in ‘racist’ Outburst,” Middle East Eye, February 22, 2023, https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/tunisia-saied-sub-saharan-immigration-racist-outburst; Mona Ben Sellem, “La Tunisie Criminalise Les Contacts Avec Les Diplomates Occidentaux,” Le Monde, March 24, 2023, https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2023/03/24/la-tunisie-criminalise-les-contacts-avec-les-diplomates-occidentaux_6166807_3212.html[xxii] Reuters, “Tunisian Police Detain Ennahda Leader Ghannouchi, Evacuate Party Headquarters,” April 18, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/tunisian-police-detain-ennahda-leader-ghannouchi-party-says-2023-04-17/.
