Riyadh’s evolving approach to international institutions

The Kingdom is driven in its foreign policy by two factors. Firstly, Riyadh seeks to be internationally recognised as a significant middle power. To do this, Riyadh seeks to secure regional hegemony, in competition with Iran, and increase its global influence. Secondly, Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman’s (MbS) ambitious Vision 2030 requires a stability in the region and favourable international rules to foster a more propitious business climate and attract FDI.[5] Vision 2030 is the defining project of MbS’ de facto rule, and it attempts to transform the Kingdom away from its dependency on oil and towards a diversified, dynamic economy- with thriving sports, entertainment, and green energy sectors.[6]

MbS’ emphasis on diplomatic engagement raises a question of Saudi Arabia’s approach to international institutions. International institutions offer states the ability to act with greater legitimacy and credibility.[7] Riyadh’s approach to international institutions has mirrored its foreign policy strategy. Established, Western-led institutions such as the UN and WTO have seen greater involvement from Saudi Arabia. A deepening of diplomatic engagement and co-operation is notable, such as offers to mediate in the Ukraine-Russia conflict. This helps Riyadh to international legitimacy as a significant diplomatic power, and reflects the power of international institutions towards this end. Institutions designed to challenge western institutions, such as BRICS and the New Development Bank, have been embraced by Riyadh. This reflects Saudi Arabia’s hedging strategy, but also a growing voice in international institutions of all forms. The ability to influence international decision making is necessary for Riyadh to make rules in their interests, helping facilitate Vision 2030.

Saudi Arabian foreign policy has sought to hedge between the rise of China and the existing security relationship it has with the United States whilst at the same time looking to become a more independent global player in its own right.[8] This behaviour is evident in the UN. For example, the Russo-Ukrainian war demonstrates Saudi ambitions and hedging. Saudi Arabia voted in favour of an immediate ceasefire in the conflict, following the lead of the United States.[9] However, Riyadh postured itself as a neutral mediator in the conflict, welcoming President Zelenskyy to the Arab League whilst maintaining a close relationship with Russia.[10] Prince Turki Al Faisal, former ambassador to Washington and London, argued that Riyadh was prepared to mediate between Russia and Ukraine due to its strong relations with both countries, and having “contributed to the fund that was established by the UN to provide support for the Ukrainian refugees in Europe”.[11] Dr. Diana Galeeva of the Gulf International Forum has argued that the Kingdom’s focus on mediation efforts is ‘personally linked’ to their ‘figurehead’, MbS.[12] MbS, Dr. Galeeva argues, can thus cast himself and the Kingdom as peacemakers[13] within international institutions such as the UN, and secure his first foreign policy objective – legitimacy as a significant middle power. The talks, held in Jeddah, were attended by officials and policy makers from 40 countries – including the G7.[14] This demonstrates the role of international institutions of legitimising Riyadh’s ambition to be an independent and significant middle power through conflict mediation.

In 2010, Abdulaziz Alwasil, then Saudi Ambassador to the United Nations in Geneva, now Ambassador in New York, argued that Saudi Arabia received widespread condemnation in human rights circles for not voting in favour of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, but has not received recognition for its adoption of international human rights instruments, such as the CESCR, CCPR, CERD, CRC, and CEDAW.[15] Alwasil argues that from the 1990s Saudi policy changed from endorsing international human rights instruments, to ratifying human rights treaties, thus becoming more deeply involved in the UN’s human rights architecture.[16] However, in 2020, following the murder of Jamal Khashoggi which the CIA believed to be ordered by MbS, Saudi Arabia lost its seat on the UN human rights council.[17] This represents the weakening of Saudi involvement in international institutions. Saudi Arabia is also routinely criticised for ongoing executions. Yet, domestic politics have also been a source of Saudi legitimacy in international institutions and offer more evidence of deepening and diversified engagement in Saudi involvement in international financial institutions.

In February 2024, Muhammed Al-Jadaan will begin his three-year term as chairman of the International Monetary Fund’s International Monetary and Financial Committee.[18] Currently serving as Saudi finance minister, Al-Jadaan was previously chair of the G20 Financial Track in 2020, during Saudi’s presidency of the G20. Al-Jadaan argued in September 2023 that strong multilateral engagement is necessary to combat economic and geopolitical fragmentation, and to respond to economic shocks. In Al-Jadaan’s opinion, “we must utilise multilateral mechanisms and platforms to promote open and fair trade, fostering collaboration among nations and economic blocs, to jointly tackle economic challenges and hence safeguard the stability and resilience of the global economy”.[19]