Egypt, once one of the most influential countries not only in the Middle East and North Africa, but also in global affairs, has been facing a major economic crisis along with spiralling inflation. Despite Cairo’s troubles, the country is rapidly building up its military capabilities, which is slowly gaining the attention of regional leaders and international observers.
Rapid Egyptian Militarization
Against the backdrop of the 2013 military coup[i] against the Muslim Brotherhood-led government, Egypt underwent a still growing militarization process[ii] under new President and former Minister of Defense Abdel Fattah el-Sisi.
Under Sisi, the military is consolidating its hold over the economic, communications, and energy sectors of the country[iii], and Cairo now has de facto military control and oversight over day-to-day governance.
Currently, President Sisi is overseeing an overhaul of the Egyptian Armed Forces, which went through a period of stagnation under Presidents Hosni Mubarak and Mohammed Morsi[iv], the former of which feared growing ambitions of a more professionalized officer corps.
Sisi might grow increasingly skeptical of future U.S. military aid as the State Department has raised concerns about Egypt’s steady turn towards authoritarianism and even introduced limited embargoes on the country.[v] Cairo’s new foreign policy doctrine is therefore less dependent on the West while it places an emphasis on becoming a regional player in the Middle East and, more widely, in Africa.
According to SIPRI[vi], Egypt became the third largest importer of weapons in the world between 2015 and 2019. Many of these weapons came from Germany, Russia, France, and potentially China.
A Looming Conflict with Ethiopia
Against the backdrop of Addis Ababa finalizing the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam[vii] (GERD), Cairo heightened belligerent rhetoric against the former[viii] as fears mount that the filling of the dam could hamper Egypt’s economy.
Both Ethiopia and Egypt have fast-rising populations, and agriculture along the Nile River is critical to maintaining food and energy sources for their respective constituents. In fears that Addis Ababa could hamper the flow of the river with GERD filling, Cairo has threatened military actions on numerous occasions[ix], which has brought foreign and international mediation to the forefront.
Likewise, Ethiopia is also facing a looming demographic and economic problem—which the issue of the country’s lack of sea access is directly related to.[x] Due to its rapidly rising population, now over 150 million, Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed is looking for direct water access, which has brought forth a diplomatic conflict with both Eritrea and Somalia[xi], and which intertwines with Egyptian concerns too.
Originally wanting port access through Eritrea, which would have collapsed the original peace deal, instead, Ethiopia signed a major deal through the breakaway region of Somaliland for port leasing in return for recognition.[xii] The deal solidifies that Ethiopia will be the first United Nations member to recognize Somaliland.
In lieu of the deal between Ethiopia and Somaliland, the government of Somalia prepared for renewed tensions as both East African nations have a history of armed conflicts. Somalia has grown military cooperation with Egypt[xiii], and Cairo has sent thousands of various equipment, troops, and logistics to Mogadishu. Ethiopia and Somaliland are preparing for a potential armed conflict with Somalia and Egypt, with ramifications on a potential, new global refugee crisis the world can ill-afford.
Tensions with Israel
The ongoing Israel-Hamas war is also having wider implications[xiv] for Egypt’s unconventional patterns of militarization. While both Israel and Egypt maintain the Camp David Accords[xv], relations soured during the Morsi era and the current war will potentially reset ties to an even greater extent.[xvi]
Fearing that the war may displace hundreds of thousands of Palestinians into the Sinai Peninsula[xvii], not only has Egypt reinforced their border with the Gaza Strip[xviii], but also warned Israel. Limited clashes have also resulted in several Egyptian military casualties.
Over the past several decades since the ending of the Yom Kippur War, the negotiations between Israel and Egypt stated that the Sinai was to be largely demilitarized[xix] with very few heavy weaponries stationed in the area. Extremist organizations such as al-Qaeda and ISIS took advantage of the powder keg and waged a deadly insurgency in the peninsula[xx] that saw thousands of deaths of Egyptian forces and major terrorist attacks on civilians.
Likewise, Egypt’s economy continues to spiral downward[xxi] as the population grows. Hosting hundreds of thousands of Palestinians would exacerbate the economic situation and draw Cairo into the Palestinian-Israeli conflict to an even greater extent, as many Egyptians remain sympathetic to the plight of Gazans. These are outcomes Egypt cannot afford.
Though an armed conflict between Egypt and Israel is unlikely, a drift with Egypt moving towards China, Russia, and BRICS[xxii], and Israel remaining firmly under America’s folds will likely deepen their divisions.
The Warning Signs from the Pentagon Leaks
During the spring of 2023, sensitive Pentagon documents were leaked by a rogue US service member.[xxiii] One of the leaked documents showed that Egypt planned to produce and transfer 40,000 artillery shells in support of Russia’s internationally condemned invasion of Ukraine.[xxiv]
Though Egypt’s government denied the allegations, it would correlate with the growing cooperation Cairo has had with Moscow[xxv], including military cooperation and the joint backing of General Khalifa Haftar’s forces in Libya.
Egypt itself is could move away from America’s influence[xxvi] and look for a more autonomous foreign policy, but this trajectory remains unlikely in the immediate term. U.S. aid and military support to Cairo are an important part of maintaining peace between Israel and Egypt, and president-elect Trump’s priority to preserve these relationships as well as expand the Abraham Accords indicates that the U.S. will keep fostering its close ties with Egypt.
In the military arena, Israel is not the only regional power that has grown stronger while Egypt has stagnated. As Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey have exerted their influence and military strength throughout the Middle East and North Africa, Cairo is feeling a renewed sense of urgency to catch up to them and be at the forefront of regional politics like they once were in the 20th century.
Egypt’s true pride intertwines with its military and force projection—both of which went through several decades of stagnation from the 1970s to 2010s. Though Egypt’s military movements and future plans cannot be predicted, one could argue Cairo’s remilitarization is more about mitigating the effects of its economic crisis on its professional cadres than to prepare for conventional armed conflict.
[i] Hoffman, J. (2023). “Ten Years After Coup, the U.S. Still Supports Tyranny in Egypt”, CATO Institute, 3 July, retrieved from: https://www.cato.org/commentary/ten-years-after-coup-us-still-supports-tyranny-egypt.
[ii] Kuimova, A. (2020). “Understanding Egyptian Military Expenditure”, SIPRI, retrieved from: https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2020-10/bp_2010_egyptian_military_spending.pdf.
[iii] Sayigh, Y. (2019). “Egypt’s Military Now Controls Much of Its Economy. Is This Wise?”, Carnegie, 25 November, retrieved from: https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2019/11/egypts-military-now-controls-much-of-its-economy-is-this-wise?lang=en.
[iv] Egypt Defense Review (2020). “Egypt’s Military Leadership Deficit”, New Lines Institute, 29 September, retrieved from: https://newlinesinstitute.org/state-resilience-fragility/civil-military-relations/egypts-military-leadership-deficit/.
[v] Jakes, L. and El-Naggar, M. (2022). “U.S. Blocks $130 Million in Aid for Egypt Over Rights Abuses”, The New York Times, 28 June, retrieved from: https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/28/us/politics/egypt-us-human-rights.html.
[vi] Kuimova (2020). “Understanding Egyptian Military Expenditure”.
[vii] Woldemariam, Y. and Donnelon-May, G. (2024). “The politics of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam”, climate Diplomacy, 2 February, retrieved from: https://climate-diplomacy.org/magazine/conflict/politics-grand-ethiopian-renaissance-dam.
[viii] Mbaku, J.M. (2020). “The controversy over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam”, Brookings, 5 August, retrieved from: https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-controversy-over-the-grand-ethiopian-renaissance-dam/.
[ix] Dunne, C.W. (2020). “The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and Egypt’s Military Options”, Arab Center Washington DC, 30 July, retrieved from: https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/the-grand-ethiopian-renaissance-dam-and-egypts-military-options/.
[x] Bereketeab, R. (2024). “Ethiopia’s Quest for a Seaport: A Threat to Regional Stability?”, Middle East Council on Global Affairs, 30 September, retrieved from: https://mecouncil.org/publication/ethiopias-quest-for-a-seaport-a-threat-to-regional-stability/.
[xi] McBride, J. (2024). “Could Resource Wars Over Water Become Frequent in the Future?”, SOFREP, 1 May, retrieved from: https://sofrep.com/news/could-resource-wars-over-water-become-frequent-in-the-future/.
[xii] Ali, F. (2024). “Ethiopia and Somaliland reach agreement over access to ports”, The Guardian, 1 January, retrieved from: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/01/ethiopia-and-somaliland-reach-historic-agreement-over-access-to-red-sea-ports.
[xiii] Levy, I. (2024). “Making the Best of Egypt’s Entrance into Somalia”, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 6 November, retrieved from: https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/making-best-egypts-entrance-somalia.
[xiv] SWP Berlin (2024). “Ice Age for the ‘Cold Peace’ between Egypt and Israel”, 14 March, retrieved from: https://www.swp-berlin.org/10.18449/2024C10/.
[xv] Peace News (2024). “The Camp David Accord: more crucial – and fragile – than ever”, 20 May, retrieved from: https://peacenews.com/the-camp-david-accords-more-crucial-and-fragile-than-ever/.
[xvi] Hugi, J. (2024). “The way out of the war in Gaza will shape Israel-Egypt relations for years”, Middle East Institute, 3 May, retrieved from: https://www.mei.edu/publications/way-out-war-gaza-will-shape-israel-egypt-relations-years.
[xvii] Petillo, K. (2023). “Tipping point: The risks of Palestinian displacement for Egypt”, European Council on Foreign Relations, 14 December, retrieved from: https://ecfr.eu/article/tipping-point-the-risks-of-palestinian-displacement-for-egypt/.
[xviii] Michaelson, R. (2024). “Egypt building walled enclosure in Sinai for Rafah refugees, photos suggest”, The Guardian, 16 February, retrieved from: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/feb/16/egypt-building-walled-enclosure-in-sinai-for-rafah-refugees-videos-suggest.
[xix] The New Arab (2024). “Are the days of a largely demilitarized Sinai over?”, 6 February, retrieved from: https://www.newarab.com/analysis/are-days-largely-demilitarised-sinai-over.
[xx] El-Hamalawy, H. (2023). “The Egyptian Army’s Counterinsurgency: History, Past Operations, and the Sinai Campaign”, Arab Reform Initiative, 13 October, retrieved from: https://www.arab-reform.net/publication/the-egyptian-armys-counterinsurgency-history-past-operations-and-the-sinai-campaign/.
[xxi] Yee, V. (2024). “Even Summer Nights Can’t Escape Egypt’s Economic Crisis”, The New York Times, 1 September, retrieved from: https://www.nytimes.com/2024/09/01/world/middleeast/egypt-economic-crisis.html.
[xxii] Council of Councils (2024). “The BRICS Summit 2024: An Expanding Alternative”, 7 November, retrieved from: https://www.cfr.org/councilofcouncils/global-memos/brics-summit-2024-expanding-alternative.
[xxiii] Alsharif, M. and Romero, D. (2024). “Pentagon leaker Jack Teixeira sentenced to 15 years in prison for sharing military secrets online”, NBC News, 12 November, retrieved from: https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/pentagon-leaker-jack-teixeira-sentenced-15-years-prison-sharing-milita-rcna179792.
[xxiv] Hill, E., Ryan, M., O’Grady, S. and Oakford, S. (2023). “Egypt secretly planned to supply rockets to Russia, leaked U.S. document says”, The Washington Post, 11 April, retrieved from: https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/04/10/egypt-weapons-russia/.
[xxv] Seric, M. (2023). “Russia and Egypt: A Fast-Growing Partnership – Analysis”, Eurasia Review, 12 December, retrieved from: https://www.eurasiareview.com/12122023-russia-and-egypt-a-fast-growing-partnership-analysis/.
[xxvi] Maher, M. and Farid, M. (2023). “The Growth of Chinese Influence in Egypt: Signs and Consequences”, The Washington Institute for Near East Affairs, 27 April, retrieved from: https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/growth-chinese-influence-egypt-signs-and-consequences.