US-Iran Negotiations Beyond Nuclear Issues Could Lead to Failure

Unlike the negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 that resulted in the 2015 JCPOA and which were limited solely to Iran’s nuclear issues, there is now significant disagreement between the US and Iran over how to expand the framework of the talks. The U.S. position – supported by Israel and European countries – advocates a broad framework and agenda that includes three areas: nuclear issues, missile building capabilities, and Iran’s regional influence via its proxy groups.

In this regard, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio said on 4 February that negotiations with Iran cannot be limited to the nuclear file. Speaking in Washington at a summit on critical mineral development, Rubio emphasized that “That includes the range of their ballistic missiles, that includes their sponsorship of terrorist organizations across the region, that includes a nuclear program and that includes the treatment of their own people.”[v] In addition, following Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu’s visit to Washington on 11 February, President Trump commented that a good deal with Iran would mean “no nuclear weapons, no missiles,” without elaborating further.[vi]

Israel undoubtedly fears that the US might pursue a narrow nuclear deal that does not include restrictions on Iran’s ballistic missile program or an end to Iranian support for armed proxies in the region. Iran has the largest stockpile of ballistic missiles in the Middle East, according to the U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence.[vii] Iranian missiles have a self-imposed range of 2,000 km (1,240 miles), which officials in the past said was enough to protect the country since it covers the distance to Israel. The arsenal also encompasses multiple long-range missiles that can reach Israel, according to the Center for Strategic and International Studies.[viii] These include the Sejil, with a range of 2,000 km; Emad, 1,700 km; Ghadr, 2,000 km; Shahab-3, 1,300 km; Khorramshahr, 2,000 km; and Hoveyzeh 1,350 km. The unveiling of a new missile city in Iran – particularly the hypersonic Khorramshahr-4 missile on 6 February – carried out at the peak of tensions and amid the large-scale deployment of U.S. forces and equipment to the Middle East, showcased a new level of Iran’s missile capabilities.[ix] The Khorramshahr-4 hypersonic missile can cover a distance of 2,000 kilometers in 12 minutes, posing a potential threat to Israel’s missile-defense shield known as the Iron Dome.

Therefore, from Israel’s perspective, unlike during the 12-day war in June 2025, Iran’s missile capabilities – and especially its ballistic missiles – constitute a more immediate threat. In this context, Netanyahu is exerting significant pressure on Washington to ensure that any agreement with Iran includes reductions in Iran’s missile capabilities, including cutting missile ranges to below 500 kilometers; otherwise, if no deal is reached, the destruction of those missile capabilities should be placed high on the agenda as an immediate priority in any subsequent strike.

By contrast, senior Iranian officials have repeatedly stated that negotiations are limited solely to nuclear issues and do not include other matters such as missile capabilities or proxy groups – referred to by Iran as the “axis of resistance.” In this regard, Admiral Ali Shamkhani, the former Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council and the current representative of the Supreme Leader in the Defense Council – a council established after the 12-day war in June – has emphasized that “Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities are a red line that will never be placed on the negotiating table”.[x] In addition, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi reiterated that Iran’s missile program has never been, and never will be, part of the agenda in the nuclear talks”.[xi]

Iranian officials are also strongly opposed to any reduction in missile ranges. In this regard, Ali Larijani, secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, said that “reducing missile ranges to “below 500 kilometers” would effectively mean accepting coercion and surrender. “If you were in our position and negotiating, would you be willing to take away the country’s most important defensive weapon from us?” he asked, describing such a demand as tantamount to seriously weakening the country’s defensive capabilities.[xii]

Therefore, it seems that if the American side insists on a broader negotiation agenda, including missile capabilities, range, and proxy groups, the negotiation framework will face failure. Iran has returned to indirect negotiations with the United States and put forward several new proposals. These include diluting enriched uranium to reduce enrichment levels, and allowing U.S. investment in Iran’s oil and gas sector, as well as in its industrial and mining industries in exchange for sanctions relief. Tehran may demonstrate some flexibility regarding a temporary suspension of domestic enrichment through the establishment of a regional nuclear consortium. Nevertheless, the scope of its flexibility is unlikely to extend to missile capabilities, which are considered to be the most important elements of the country’s defense and deterrence capabilities. The same goes to proxy groups in Iran’s “Axis of Resistance.” From the perspective of the Islamic Republic, such concessions would be tantamount to surrender and national humiliation.

Concerns over this very gap – whether the negotiating framework and agenda should be narrow or broad – has pushed some mediators, such as Turkey, toward middle-ground solutions. “My advice always to the American friends, close the files one by one with Iran. Start with nuclear, close it, then the others”,[xiii] said Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan. Nevertheless, as mentioned, it appears highly unlikely that Iran would agree to even a gradualist approach – after negotiating and reaching a deal on nuclear issues. Its missile capabilities are regarded as a red line in Iran’s national security doctrine and a key element of its defensive deterrence.