What does the recent Russia-Oman rapprochement mean?

On 22 April, Sultan Haitham bin Tariq became the first Omani leader to have visited Russia, where he met with President Vladimir Putin,[i][ii] and signed ten agreements ranging from memoranda of understanding and a mutual visa exemption programme, to cooperation in trade, diplomacy, the media sector, and climate change.[iii]

This latest development in Oman-Russia relations is indicative of a broader realignment in the current multipolar international system, in which smaller states take on an approach of tactical balancing between East and West.

Oman’s long-time position of neutrality

This year marks the 40^th anniversary of diplomatic relations between Oman and Russia which date back to 1985–the USSR first opened an embassy in Muscat in 1987 and was represented by a non-resident ambassador for two years.[iv] By comparison, the United Kingdom and Oman have fostered over 225 years of government-to-government relations[v], following the Treaty of Enduring Relations, signed in 1800[vi].

Oman’s neutral foreign policy under its long-time leader, Sultan Qaboos bin Sa’id Al Said, has undergone important changes in recent decades; especially under the new leadership of his cousin, Haytham bin Tariq Al Said[vii].

Among the first signs of a more prominent opening towards Russia was minister of culture, youth, and sports Crown Prince Sayyid Theyazin bin Haitham Al Said’s meeting with Putin in 2023.[viii] The Crown Prince echoed Putin’s thinking about the importance of building ‘a new fair world order and economic relations without double standards’[ix]. He advocated establishing new mechanisms for trade and economic collaboration with the creation of new centres of the international economy, reflecting the large populations and valuable natural resources of locations across Africa and Asia[x].

Despite this, London has remained the strategic hard power partner of choice for Muscat. Anglo-Omani military actions rely on maritime activities (e.g. the Joint Logistics support Base at Duqm is one of the few Royal Navy bases in the Indian Ocean)[xi]. Importantly, the British Army has access to the Ras Madrakah base, and Oman and the UK are focusing on their military partnership for the fourth Saif Sareea exercise scheduled for 2028[xii]. Economic relations between the two countries also remain strong. UK companies make up to 50% of the foreign direct investment currently registered in Oman[xiii]. Oman-US trade is also significant, having reached a total value of $1.6 billion in 2022.[xiv]

With the ongoing development of economic relations between Oman and Russia, the trade turnover between the two countries reached $90 million in 2017. This increased up to $314 million[xv] by 2024. Oman’s main exports include metal and potassium products, and nitrogen while Russian imports to the country are made up of iron and food products primarily.[xvi] Notably, in 2024, Oman was a guest of honour at the 27^th Saint Petersburg International Economic Forum, which fits with the efforts to realise its Vision 2040, to attract foreign capital to economically viable projects in Oman[xvii]. The Forum also became the platform to promote the Omani brand, “Made in Oman”[xviii].

Spheres of cooperation

While Muscat has developed relations with London in the hard power sphere, its ties with Moscow rely on soft power mechanisms primarily. For example, in 2025, the “Hermitage Museum” section was opened at the National Museum of Oman,[xix] and Russian cultural events were held in the Royal Opera House of Muscat, with exhibitions from the Kremlin Museums and the Treatyakov Gallery.[xx] Jamal bin Hassan al Mousawi, Secretary-General of the National Museum, emphasised the value of cultural collaboration, arguing that ‘this represents both countries’ efforts to strengthen civilisational ties.’[xxi]

The new approach is a subtle shift for the ‘Switzerland of the Middle East’, and might serve as the bedrock for more substantial economic collaboration in the future.[xxii] This indicates Muscat’s intention to carefully separate Western and ‘Eastern’ spheres of influence in Oman’s foreign relations, carving out a space for both, without risking the two coming into conflict with each other.

This approach also assists Muscat in maintaining its well-recognised status as a trusted mediator between different sides having a stake in regional conflicts.

For example, one of the key topics of discussion between President Putin and Sultan Haitham was the ongoing Iranian nuclear negotiations.[xxiii] Yuri Ushakov, aide to the President of Russia for Foreign Policy, commented that ‘We maintain close contact with our Iranian colleagues. Where we can, we help.’[xxiv] Moscow has played a role in international negotiations on Iran’s nuclear programme in the past, most prominently as a veto-wielding UN Security Council member and a signatory to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). In late April and ahead of the meeting between Iranian and Russian foreign office officials, Sergey Lavrov stated that Moscow is ‘ready to assist, mediate and play any role that will be beneficial to Iran and the US.’[xxv] Developed ties with Russia continue to assist Oman in serving as a credible mediator for Iran while strong relations with Western countries, including the US, are crucial to remaining neutral and furthering tangible steps forward in a tricky deal.

A model of strategic dual alignment?

The take-away from the budding relationship between Oman and Russia for Western countries is that more and more smaller states in the Middle East–and beyond–might prefer to pursue a strategy of dual alignment in the future, especially amidst an intensifying West vs. East rivalry. This does not entail a contraction of the space available for Western countries in their foreign policy with Oman, however.

In his recent visit to Muscat, David Lammy, the United Kingdom’s Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs, highlighted the UK’s commitment to developing relations on trade, defence and security[xxvi]; hard power dimensions, in which Oman, as a small country but with strategic access to the Indian Ocean, remains crucial[xxvii]. Both countries seek to integrate their collaborations with “Omani Vision 2040” and the UK’s “Global Vision”, seeing how these can be further boosted thanks to initiatives such as the Joint Logistics Support Base at the port of Duqm (with a £10 billion investment) and the UK-Oman Sovereign Investment partnership to develop future trade.[xxviii]

Furthermore, as Oman has proved itself an essential mediator in the context of the war in Yemen too, and as the US and Russia look towards a degree of rapprochement with Trump’s ambition to end the war in Ukraine, Oman’s importance as a bridge could increase even further.

Oman-Russia rapprochement takes place in the context of these new realities of great power politics, defined by a diffusion of power, a shift to multipolarity, and re-alignment based on the calculations of smaller states to prioritise their relations with various poles of power at the same time. Oman’s approach of pursuing the hard power dimension with the West in parallel with a soft power approach with Russia might serve as an instructive case for smaller states in the region.