Türkiye’s Balancing Role in Europe’s Security

The Trump administration’s change of tone on the US’ transatlantic commitments and the possibility of the president reducing American military presence in Europe has propelled forward policy initiatives for the buttressing of the continent’s indigenous security architecture—a process that was already underway, albeit to a much more limited degree, as a result of the resurfacing of great power rivalry with Russia on the EU’s immediate borders. Türkiye can potentially play a pivotal role in this new security climate as a country not only at the bridge between Europe and Asia, but also between the West and Russia, all the while operating from within NATO.[i]

In the context of the Russia-Ukraine war, the most pressing security threat to Europe at present and arguably in decades, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy called for Türkiye to take a more active part in peace negotiations[ii] alongside the US and the EU. The Turkish government’s participation in high-level meetings such as the ‘Securing Our Future’ summit in London[iii] highlighted Ankara’s strategic importance in the conflict for European leaders too. Türkiye could take part in a peacekeeping force deployed as part of European security guarantees in Ukraine.[iv] It could even act as a counterweight behind the eastern front, thanks to its dialogue with Moscow, based on rudimentary plans that have been suggested so far.

The second Trump administration also supports Türkiye playing a more active role on NATO’s eastern flank and as a potential deterrent against Russia. Notwithstanding, risks of a possible military mobilization in the Black Sea could undermine the viability of such plans and put Türkiye in a difficult position too, especially in terms of its high energy dependence on Russia.

Both the continued importance of security in the Black Sea area and the fall of the Assad regime in Syria towards the end of 2024—renewing risks of migratory flows towards Europe—provide incentives for European capitals to take Türkiye seriously in the context of their own security considerations. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s recent remarks emphasized that from Ankara’s perspective, “European security without Türkiye” is unthinkable.[v]

Just how integral a role Türkiye can play in European security is however dependent on what benefits it can reap in exchange. Türkiye-EU relations have for long been at a standstill with the country’s EU candidate status effectively frozen since 1999. While Türkiye’s human rights record has been one of the points of contention, the country’s deepening recession and inflation crisis represent additional barriers in front of EU membership. Türkiye-EU disagreements about the island of Cyprus and its persisting division between its Greek- and Türkiye-aligned polities is another political challenge to be resolved. Türkiye is, of course, not unilaterally responsible for stalled negotiations as the EU’s own reckoning with its ‘deepening’ and ‘widening’, especially since the fiasco of Brexit in 2016, have given way to much more cautious policies when it comes to expanding its membership.

Adding to the complexities inherent in Türkiye’s combined relationship with Russia, its membership of NATO, and its history with the EU is the apparent bifurcation of the Western alliance—with the U.S. and a few of its European allies such as Italy and Hungary serving as one stream, and the rest of European countries, both within and outside of the EU, serving as another.

The US could position Türkiye as a close strategic partner, seeing it as a counterweight to EU-championed strategies in Ukraine, but only with risking an increase in Ankara’s weight in the European security sphere. On the flip side, Ankara, should it fall in line with either US or EU-led initiatives, would risk raising suspicions about its commitments to the West in Moscow, with the Kremlin having its hands on very tangible levers of influence.

As Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan recently said, “the genie is out of the bottle”.[vi] While Türkiye can gain diplomatic leverage by balancing between the parties, being forced to choose sides in the tensions between the US and the EU, or the West and Russia could damage relations with all sides. Instead, Türkiye’s balancing act is more likely to take place in the context of a more complex, three-pronged strategy, considering European, US and Russian interests alongside its own strategic priorities.

The Türkiye-EU relationship: Security strengths, economic incentives and political weaknesses

Over the past three years of the Russia-Ukraine war, the value of hard power has increased in the eyes of even those European policymakers, who have for long preferred neoliberalism and managing international relations in multilateral frameworks. Türkiye’s prominent firepower with the second-largest army within NATO has certainly positioned it as a desirable partner.

This standing is bolstered by the country’s strong defence industry. In 2024, Türkiye’s defence exports have risen to $7.2 billion, with its global share increasing by 103 percent in the last four years.[vii] Baykar’s acquisition of Piaggio followed by a technological partnership agreement with Leonardo[viii] are noteworthy for the Turkish defence industry’s entry into the European market and advanced UAV field. In this context, the Eurodrone project, launched almost 10 years ago to increase Europe’s strategic autonomy in unmanned aerial technologies (in particular to reduce dependence on US-made systems such as the MQ-9 Reaper), is facing challenges due to internal criticism of its cost-value ratio in addition to delays. Although Türkiye’s low-cost and rapid production capacity is attractive for financial burden-sharing, Europe’s vision of “strategic autonomy” and its preference to protect its own industry make Türkiye’s involvement in the project practically difficult.

Moreover, Türkiye’s recent exclusion from the F-35 program by the US may raise concerns that Europe will follow a comparable path when it comes to technology-sharing agreements. An alternative to Eurodrone could take shape through a Turkish-Italian bilateral cooperation framework (e.g. via Baykar’s “Akıncı”). Thus, instead of a full partnership in unmanned technologies, Turkish UAVs could find individual buyers in countries such as Ukraine and Poland via third-party countries inside the EU.

Türkiye (like the US and the UK) does not benefit from the EU’s new $150 billion defence budget.[ix] Despite the current conjuncture, it is important to recognize that Türkiye’s EU candidate status does not in practice open the door to defence cooperation. The EU is citing Türkiye’s behaviour and military presence in northern Cyprus, and its tensions with Greece and southern Cyprus in the Eastern Mediterranean over issues such as maritime jurisdiction and drilling activities, as conditions for full partnership in this area.

The fact that Türkiye’s participation in the EU’s SAFE program for joint defence procurement[x] requires the approval of all EU members also highlights the political and bureaucratic obstacles to Türkiye’s participation in EU defence projects. South Korea and Japan have both signed a Security and Defence Partnership Agreement to access EU defence loans (and negotiations with Canada are ongoing), while Türkiye, as an EU candidate country, is nowhere to be found in similar negotiations. For similar reasons, participation in defence cooperation frameworks such as Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) is not directly possible for Türkiye either.

Although there is a widespread view that the EU’s exclusion of Türkiye from its security policies is unsustainable, Ankara will not be satisfied with an ad-hoc partnership and will want a more institutionalized and permanent role. Participation in the European Peace Facility (EPF), which the EU established in 2021 and which can provide defence support to non-member states, could allow Türkiye to overcome political obstacles to access funding in scenarios such as increasing arms deliveries to Ukraine or joining a peacekeeping force.

For the EU to rely on or cooperate with Türkiye more substantially in the security realm, it would need to consider the easing of its restrictions in the context of the above frameworks and mechanisms. The evolving security situation vis-a-vis Russia might give way to such changes, but what extent they will reach is still uncertain.

In the meantime, strengthening Türkiye’s security cooperation with Europe is more likely to be seen in partnerships in defence industry projects and the energy sector. As for the latter, TurkStream, which transports gas from Russia via the Black Sea to Türkiye and from there to Southern Europe (Bulgaria, Serbia, Hungary), is the only remaining Russian gas route to Europe. As a step forward, integrating Eastern Mediterranean gas into the Southern Gas Corridor, which brings gas from Azerbaijan to Europe via TANAP (Trans-Anatolian Pipeline) and TAP (Trans-Adriatic Pipeline), could make Türkiye an even more important actor in the EU’s energy diversification strategy. However, technical and political obstacles (including the Cyprus issue and broader Greek-Turkish tensions) would need to be overcome.

The search for solutions in the Eastern Mediterranean to revive the EU-Türkiye energy dialogue, which has been frozen since 2019, could gain momentum not only due to energy diversification and substitution efforts in the wake of the Russia-Ukraine war, but also as a result of change in power dynamics in Syria after the fall of the Assad regime.

Greek-Turkish relations are showing a moderate improvement with reduced airspace violations, enhanced migration cooperation and growing trade. Despite Greek objections[xi], Türkiye is strengthening its military integration into Europe with the purchase of 40 Eurofighter Typhoon jets[xii], while France’s role in the production of Meteor missiles could further complicate the situation[xiii] due to its cooperation with Athens. Cyprus remains a key point of contention and a solution depends on international legal agreements on maritime boundaries and Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs). Türkiye is not a party to UNCLOS and asserts its own continental shelf claims (e.g. the 2019 Türkiye-Libya agreement). An agreement between the parties is therefore not on the horizon. Therefore, it is important to pay attention to the Israeli-Greek-Southern Cypriot cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean (e.g. EastMed pipeline), especially vis-a-vis Türkiye.

Conclusion

Türkiye-EU relations will continue to move in a pragmatic direction due to the war in Ukraine, the importance of security in the Black Sea and the risks associated with the overhaul of Syria’s political system. Although question marks regarding Cyprus, Turkish ties with Russia, the Turkish economy and democratic backsliding remain, Türkiye’s geopolitical position and military prominence will likely overshadow these issues.

The recent arrest of Ekrem İmamoğlu, the mayor of Istanbul (and the main opposition party’s presidential candidate), has, again, rung alarm bells in the West about democratic backsliding in Türkiye.[xiv] Although there have been statements of condemnation from Europe, this is unlikely to translate into a tangible response. Türkiye’s importance in issues such as migration, trade, energy and defense will counter the rhetoric of authoritarianism at a time when the value-based international order appears to come second in importance compared to hard power threats. Moreover, Europe, seeing the absolute centralization of the state apparatus in Türkiye and the fact that elections are still 2.5 years away, is likely to think that its reactions will not lead to any concrete change in Türkiye and may even consolidate the government and its electorate.

For Türkiye, which is trying to navigate its relationship with both the US and the EU while also seeking to diversify its foreign policy via alternative platforms such as BRICS,[xv] the way forward might lead through continued balancing. The risk of confrontation with Russia in the Black Sea and in sectors in which the Turkish economy relies on Russia, and the permanent exclusion from EU and US defence programs remain key considerations for Ankara. In light of its clash of interests with all of the above parties, Ankara finds itself at the bridge between three poles of global power.