Russia’s Military Assistance May Be the Last Option to Prevent Iran from Getting the Bomb, but It is Unlikely to Succeed

No matter how the current escalation between Israel and Iran ends, it has already raised serious questions among the Iranian elite.[i] Tehran is facing significant security challenges that have exposed vulnerabilities in its defense strategy.[ii] The long-standing deterrence strategy of the Islamic Republic, which has relied on Lebanese Hezbollah as a central pillar against Israel and U.S. forces in the Middle East, now seems weaker than Tehran had anticipated. As a result, Iran resorted to the last tool in its arsenal—using ballistic missiles to establish new red lines in hopes of halting further escalation.

The realization that its main adversaries—Israel and the U.S.—are much stronger than Iran was anything but surprising for Tehran. The entire foundation of Iranian asymmetric warfare[iii] has been built on acknowledging the military and technological superiority of its enemies. However, in 2024, Iran found itself feeling more vulnerable than at any time in the past 30 years. First, its grey-zone strategy, which heavily relies on non-state actors like Hamas and Hezbollah, did not produce the desired outcomes. Second, the prospect of a direct military strike from Israel or the U.S. has become a real possibility, renewing the regime’s fears about its survival.

These developments have sparked speculation among foreign analysts[iv] and respected Iranian strategists[v] that Tehran may shift its focus from simply becoming a nuclear-threshold state to actively pursuing nuclear weapons. Moreover, senior Iranian officials have publicly hinted that Tehran could revise its nuclear doctrine.[vi] While we cano’t predict with certainty whether this will happen, Tehran today is arguably closer to deciding on acquiring a nuclear weapon than ever before.

Though no nation supports Iran obtaining a nuclear weapon openly, it is also evident that the international community has limited leverage to prevent it from achieving this goal in the long term if Tehran is determined. Military actions, including potential strikes by Israel or the U.S., might only delay the issue for a while.[vii] Moreover, further economic sanctions would hardly make a difference, as Iran is already heavily sanctioned by the West.

One key reason Tehran has refrained from pursuing a nuclear weapon may be its fear of severe reactions from Russia and China, which could lead to total economic isolation. Yet, the current crisis with Israel has shown[viii] that neither Moscow nor Beijing would risk military confrontation to defend Iran. Thus, if the choice is between possible sanctions from Russia and China and an existential threat, opting for the first seems rational. Today’s world offers no better guarantee of survival against stronger enemies than nuclear weapons, a fact made abundantly clear by North Korea’s example.

The last opportunity to deter Tehran from this path might lie in Russian military assistance. While Moscow is unlikely to risk direct confrontation with Israel or the U.S. to save Iran, it could deliver advanced air defense systems, such as the S-400, and fighter jets like the SU-35. These could help Iran build a military shield, making any strikes against it far more challenging. For Iran, this may appear as the last non-nuclear option to ensure its survival.

For Russia, this approach provides an opportunity to gain leverage over Iran. If Iran takes actions that Moscow disapproves of, Russia could halt maintenance of its military equipment. In this sense, Moscow could have more influence over Tehran’s decision to pursue nuclear weapons.

However, while this scenario seems logical on paper, it is far from straightforward. First, Iran’s leaders and much of its population have long been determined to reduce their dependence on great powers. Fear of foreign intervention and colonialism played a significant role in sparking the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Russia is often viewed by Iranians as an imperial power eager to control Iran’s resources. A deeper reliance on Russian support is likely to face resistance, even among the elite.

Second, it would take years and considerable resources for Iran to develop a new national air defense system using Russian weaponry. The delivery of just a few jets or a single S-400 system would hardly alter the regional balance of power. Achieving this goal could take a decade or more, which Tehran might view as too slow given its current security threats. In this case, acquiring nuclear weapons may seem faster and cheaper.

Russia, for its part, may also have its doubts. Moscow is deeply involved in the war in Ukraine and faces significant demands for weapons at home. Military analysts have noted[ix] that Russia currently lacks the spare air defense systems needed for export. Additionally, the Russian Defense Ministry’s ongoing reforms have created a massive demand for military equipment domestically[x], limiting its ability to fulfill external contracts. In the short to medium term, Moscow is likely to prioritize its own needs in weaponry over foreign commitments, including to Iran.

Moreover, supplying Iran with significant military equipment could damage Moscow’s relations with the Gulf states and Turkey. While Iran is an important Middle Eastern partner for Russia, it is not the only one. For example, Russian trade with the UAE is more than double its trade with Iran[xi], and Moscow has a vital interest in maintaining good relations with Saudi Arabia to influence the global oil market. Russian trade with Turkey was valued at $55 billion in 2023[xii], compared to just $4 billion with Iran.[xiii]

In conclusion, Russian military assistance to Iran could become the last argument preventing Tehran from acquiring nuclear weapons. However, this scenario still faces numerous challenges. Both sides may view it as too time-consuming, risky, and complex, making it less likely to succeed.