The ongoing conflict in Yemen has had devastating effects on the economy, fracturing it along the lines of the warring parties. The country is effectively split between the internationally recognized government, which theoretically controls much of the south but is actually based in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, and the Houthi rebels, who hold sway over the north, including the capital, Sanaa. The Southern Transitional Council (STC) further complicates the landscape by controlling most of the southern governorates. This divide has severely disrupted economic activity, trade, and the provision of basic services. The government struggles to pay salaries, while the Houthis have set up parallel institutions and a separate central bank. The resulting divergence in monetary policy, with both sides printing rival banknotes, has fuelled inflation and exchange rate instability. Businesses face immense challenges operating across frontlines, grappling with multiple currencies, fragmented markets, and shifting regulations. Despite these difficulties, the private sector has shown remarkable resilience, finding ways to continue functioning, albeit at a reduced capacity.
Yemen’s private sector holds significant yet untapped potential to support peacebuilding efforts. However, this can only be realised through policies carefully tailored to the political economy context that businesses operate within. It is essential to recognise that the challenges facing Yemen’s private sector are not solely a result of the ongoing conflict. The roots of these problems can be traced back to the pre-war period, where political and business elites leveraged corporate resources to serve their own interests.[i] The misaligned incentives and networks of these elites have long obstructed meaningful reforms in Yemen.[ii]
Despite the conflict’s severe impact on human capital development, with an estimated 4.5 million children out of school[iii], Yemen’s population possesses valuable skills and knowledge, particularly in the agricultural sector, which employed a significant portion of the workforce prior to the conflict.[iv] The conflict has also led to a high unemployment rate, estimated at 17.61% in 2022, with youth unemployment being significantly higher at 33.05%.[v] This suggests the presence of a large mass of unemployed but potentially skilled workers who could contribute to economic recovery efforts. If provided proper incentives and oversight, companies can transition to becoming partners in economic recovery and lasting peace by tapping into this potential and revitalising key industries in Yemen, such as agriculture, textiles, and manufacturing.
Companies can transition to becoming partners in economic recovery and lasting peace.
Yemen’s greatest asset is its young and resilient population, with 75% under the age of 25.[vi] Prior to the conflict, Yemen had made progress in expanding access to education. According to the UNESCO Institute for Statistics, Yemen’s gross enrolment ratio for primary education reached 84.17% in 2016.[vii] However, the war has severely disrupted the education system, with thousands of schools damaged or closed and many children unable to attend due to displacement, poverty, or the lack of security. Despite these challenges, Yemenis have demonstrated remarkable adaptability and entrepreneurial spirit, with many turning to informal sector activities to survive. The country also has a rich tradition of craftsmanship, particularly in sectors such as agriculture, fisheries, and artisanal industries, which could be leveraged for economic growth and job creation.
In the meantime, international development organisations continue to operate in Yemen, providing essential humanitarian assistance and supporting economic recovery efforts where possible. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is working to restore livelihoods and basic services, with projects focused on emergency employment, small business grants, and the rehabilitation of critical infrastructure in areas such as Aden, Hodeidah, and Sana’a. The World Bank, through its International Development Association (IDA), has reached over $3 billion since 2016 to support projects in health, nutrition, education, water, and energy, with a focus on the most vulnerable communities across the country.[viii] The Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) is supporting agricultural livelihoods and food security, particularly in rural areas, through input distribution, veterinary services, and cash assistance programs. UNICEF is working to provide water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) services, as well as education and child protection, in both government and Houthi-controlled areas.
Rebuilding and upgrading this infrastructure will be critical to boosting the private sector and laying the foundations for sustainable development.
The conflict has taken a heavy toll on Yemen’s already limited infrastructure. The electricity grid has been severely damaged, with frequent power outages affecting businesses and households. The road network has also suffered from a lack of maintenance and damage from airstrikes and fighting, hampering the movement of goods and people. The telecommunications sector, while relatively more resilient, faces challenges in terms of coverage and affordability. Rebuilding and upgrading this infrastructure will be critical to boosting the private sector and laying the foundations for sustainable development. This will require significant investment and coordination between the government, international donors, and the private sector itself. Furthermore, targeted education and training programmes can help bridge the skills gap and equip the workforce with the necessary knowledge to contribute to economic recovery efforts.
Political Economy Context
A concentration of power among a few elite families has led to misaligned incentives between the ruling class and the broader population, as these elites prioritise their own interests over inclusive economic growth and development.
Critics argue that over-reliance on temporary foreign aid alone risks failure from local elite capture[ix], necessitating sustainable solutions through long-term private sector partnerships. Yet this opportunity itself hinges on navigating risks, power dynamics, and misaligned incentives obstructing progress and reforms historically.[x] In Yemen, these power dynamics involve the complex relationships between the government, influential tribal leaders, and powerful business elites. For example, the Al-Ahmar family, a prominent tribal and business dynasty, had wielded significant influence over Yemen’s political and economic landscape, often leveraging their position to secure favourable deals and maintain control over key industries.[xi] This concentration of power among a few elite families has led to misaligned incentives between the ruling class and the broader population, as these elites prioritise their own interests over inclusive economic growth and development. Furthermore, the ongoing conflict has exacerbated these power imbalances, with various factions vying for control over resources and territory[xii], further complicating efforts to foster a more equitable and sustainable economic environment.[xiii]
Powerful political and business elites in Yemen have historically displayed rent-seeking behaviours that divert resources to serve narrow interests.[xiv] A few influential families and tribal coalitions allied with the regime, who appropriated assets following the unification of the country in 1990. These assets included valuable land, real estate, and state-owned enterprises that were privatised and distributed among the ruling elite.[xv] The Al-Ahmar family, which was aligned with the previous president of Yemen, Ali Abdullah Saleh, held major stakes across telecom, banking, oil, and gas, enabling political influence.[xvi] Other prominent figures, such as Shaher Abdulhak, also benefited from his close ties to the regime, securing lucrative contracts and monopolies in various industries. Shaher Abdulhak held stakes in the banking and real estate sectors.[xvii] [xviii] This concentration of economic power allowed these elite factions to shape policy decisions and maintain their dominance. The misaligned incentives of such elite networks frequently obstruct reforms.[xix]
Local tribal coalitions, economic elites, and power brokers heavily influence and disrupt economic policies to serve their own interests in many conflict-affected states.[xx] Reforms often fail without accounting for these local stakeholder incentives. Specifically, elite predation and exclusion affect marginalised groups amidst crises.[xxi] Furthermore, past recognition initiatives achieved limited traction due to transformed elite resistance, coalition gaps, and institutional weaknesses.
After the national dialogue conference in Yemen in 2013 and the coup carried out by the Ansar Allah/Houthi group in 2014, nothing changed in the Yemeni scene in terms of the private sector transforming to a national partner, but rather it continued to be a partner of the warring political forces in Yemen. The conflict led to a bifurcation of the private sector, with businesses in Houthi-controlled areas forced to navigate a complex web of regulations and taxes imposed by the rebel group, while those in government-held territories faced challenges related to corruption, instability, and limited access to resources.[xxii] This division further complicated efforts to foster a more inclusive and sustainable economic environment, as businesses on both sides of the conflict prioritised their own survival and interests over broader national concerns.
Additionally, the war in Yemen has led to the emergence of new private sectors controlled by warlords. For example, the Saudi-led coalition’s intervention in Yemen has given rise to a thriving war economy, with businesses linked to the coalition benefiting from lucrative contracts in the security, logistics, and reconstruction sectors.[xxiii] In Taiz, a city that has been at the centre of the conflict, the Abu Al-Abbas Brigade, led by Adel Abdo Farea (also known as Abu Al-Abbas), has established a monopoly over the city’s fuel market, using its control over the local security apparatus to extract rents and manipulate prices.[xxiv] Similarly, in Aden, the Southern Transitional Council (STC), a separatist group backed by the United Arab Emirates, has seized control of key economic assets, including the port and the airport, enabling it to generate revenue and consolidate its position.[xxv] More broadly, political and business elites leverage corporate resources to serve narrow interests.[xxvi] If unaddressed, similar dynamics could hamper progress once again.
However, nascent opportunities exist for enterprises to spearhead targeted initiatives addressing urgent community needs if the initial space can be carved out. As MacSweeney notes, “private firms possess innate logistical capacities that could pioneer stopgap goods provision even amid high uncertainty.”[xxvii]
The Peacebuilding Potential of Business in Yemen
Constructively harnessing the power, resources, and distribution capacities of Yemen’s domestic companies could complement political solutions by empowering communities economically in a sustainable manner.
In conflict-affected environments like Yemen, where institutions are weak or dysfunctional, the private sector has a strong incentive to support efforts that promote stability and good governance.
One of the most critical factors in harnessing the private sector’s potential for peacebuilding is recognising that firms have vested profit interests in stable and functioning institutions. Businesses require predictable and reliable economic, legal, and regulatory frameworks to operate effectively and grow. In conflict-affected environments like Yemen, where institutions are weak or dysfunctional, the private sector has a strong incentive to support efforts that promote stability and good governance. By aligning commercial interests with peacebuilding priorities, policymakers and development actors can leverage this powerful driver for change.[xxviii]
Incentivising private sector contributions to governance reforms and peace processes is a key strategy for capitalising on this alignment. This can involve providing targeted support, such as tax breaks, preferential financing, or procurement contracts, to businesses that actively engage in peacebuilding activities. These incentives not only encourage firms to participate in efforts to promote stability but also help to create a more conducive environment for business growth and investment. As more firms recognise the benefits of supporting peacebuilding initiatives, they can become important advocates for change, using their influence and resources to push for reforms and drive progress towards lasting peace.
Firstly, enterprises create productive jobs and livelihoods.[xxix] Sustainable employment generation depends on inputs, training, and access to finance, but it also reduces desperation and resentment. Secondly, firms can provide basic goods and services by rehabilitating infrastructure and pioneering delivery models.[xxx] Partnering with social enterprises also improves distribution capacity. Thirdly, companies may redirect resources towards meeting pressing social needs through corporate social responsibility.[xxxi] Even small initiatives show alignment with communities over conflict actors. Additionally, constructive engagement with business associations channels economic grievances away from violence.[xxxii] These groups also propagate cooperative norms.
Harnessing these promising opportunities for Yemeni businesses large and small to expand basic service access and employment in alignment with peacebuilding requires policy adjustments by domestic and international stakeholders. Leveraging commercial engagement in fragile states depends on reforms incentivizing community embeddedness over predation through regional procurement contracts, expanded trade finance access, infrastructure cost relief, and start-up incubators refocused on social returns. Strategically engaging business is thus complementary to political economy actor participation.[xxxiii] Sustainable solutions must emphasise stimulating local enterprise over aid dependence.
Policies for Engaging Business in Peacebuilding
While opportunities exist for the private sector to support stability, realistically, policymakers struggle with extracting reforms amid sunk capacity and active clashes. Still, targeted programmes promoting incremental business contributions maintain value aligned with diplomatic initiatives’ outcomes uncertainty. To effectively engage Yemen’s private sector for peacebuilding, policies must complement deeper engagement with influential political economy stakeholders:
- Incentivise contributions through tax breaks, financing, and procurement contracts for verifiable peacebuilding activities.
- Sequence policies are gradually based on absorptive capacities, starting with sub-national initiatives.
- Couple assistance with transparency requirements and community oversight mechanisms.
Additionally, providing technical support and access to credit for small enterprises assists with recovery and employment generation[xxxiv] [xxxv]. But apolitical development should not absolve the state’s core duties.[xxxvi] With pragmatism, the private sector can construct alternatives amidst Yemen’s complex conflict.
Enabling basic engagement could involve establishing localised industry forums for constraints dialogue, deploying technical assistance to safer SME pockets, and minimally financing resilient startups, if paired with oversight. Incremental formalisation allows information sharing and aggregation, supporting independent commercial initiatives addressing urgent needs.[xxxvii]
Additionally, diplomatic messaging could deter large firm practices like fuel smuggling through reputational risk awareness regarding investor perceptions after any settlement. Private sector stakeholders, particularly those in industries such as oil, gas, and manufacturing, have a vested interest in maintaining access to international markets and attracting foreign investment. By engaging in practices like fuel smuggling, these firms risk damaging their reputation and losing access to critical resources and partnerships. Private sector stakeholders, on the other hand, by collaborating with the government and aligning their practices with international standards of transparency and accountability, can position themselves as attractive partners for foreign investors seeking to enter the Yemeni market post-conflict.
Moreover, private sector stakeholders have much to gain from working with the government to establish a more stable and predictable business environment. Collaborating with the government can help businesses to:
- Reduce operational risks: By working with the government to address security concerns, improve infrastructure, and streamline regulations, businesses can minimise the risks associated with operating in a conflict-affected environment.
- Improve access to finance: Collaborating with the government can help businesses to access new sources of funding, such as government-backed loans, grants, or guarantees, which can be critical for growth and expansion.
- Expand market opportunities: By aligning their practices with government priorities and contributing to economic recovery efforts, businesses can position themselves to take advantage of new market opportunities, such as government contracts or partnerships with international firms.
- Enhance reputation and legitimacy: Collaborating with the government and demonstrating a commitment to transparency, accountability, and social responsibility can help businesses to build trust with local communities and enhance their reputation both domestically and internationally.
Signals aligning business elite incentives with governance transparency could bolster wider positioning shifts, as private sector leaders recognise the long-term benefits of supporting a more stable, inclusive, and sustainable economic framework Progress depends on triangulating efforts[xxxviii] between the government, private sector, and international stakeholders to create a mutually reinforcing system of incentives and accountability.
Implementation may focus on relatively stable southern regions where fewer threats exist and infrastructure remains functional. Absorptive capacity varies subrationally; tiered policies can account for this.[xxxix] Contribution risks by large companies outweigh potential until monitoring mechanisms are set. But conversations on social values start.
The Role of the International Community
International donors and aid agencies should allocate funding towards programs that promote private sector development aligned with peace priorities. This includes providing assistance to businesses and creating a business-friendly environment. Donors can also facilitate connections between enterprises and potential international partners.
Moreover, diplomats need to consider incorporating the voices and perspectives of businesses into conflict resolution and peace process initiatives. Private sector interests are often overlooked during such negotiations.
Lastly, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and the World Food Programme (WFP), as well as other multilateral organisations like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) must strengthen their expertise and advisory capacity when it comes to engaging the sector in fragile states like Yemen. These organisations have been actively involved in providing humanitarian assistance, supporting economic recovery, and promoting peacebuilding efforts in Yemen. For example, the UNDP has been working to restore livelihoods and improve access to basic services, while the World Bank has provided financial support for reconstruction and development projects (UNDP, 2021; World Bank, 2021). However, to effectively harness the potential of the private sector to contribute to these efforts, these organisations must develop a more nuanced understanding of the specific context and challenges faced by businesses operating in conflict-affected areas. This requires investing in specialised expertise and strengthening their capacity to provide targeted advice and support to private sector actors navigating complex political and economic landscapes. Enhancing this capacity will have implications not only for Yemen but also for other conflicts worldwide, as the lessons learned and best practices developed can be applied to similar contexts.
The community’s role cannot be understated as they provide financing, facilitation and knowledge transfer. Through these efforts domestic policymakers can effectively engage Yemen’s sector in building lasting peace and promoting recovery.
Challenges and Risks of Engaging Business
Engaging with smaller firms, particularly those operating in sectors such as agriculture, retail, and services, can provide several benefits in the context of peacebuilding efforts.
The factors that may impede private sector policy reforms and hamper constructive engagement around peacebuilding amidst ongoing conflict include institutional dynamics excluding new groups, risks of unintended backlash effects[xl], incentives for influential actors to capture rather than collaborate[xli], and sequencing reforms before establishing foundations.[xlii]
While engaging Yemen’s private sector holds peacebuilding potential, risks remain regarding implementation in an unstable context. Firstly, influxes of assistance heighten the dangers of predation by elites, as observed in cases from Afghanistan to Iraq.[xliii] Strict oversight must counteract corruption opportunities from new funding flows. Secondly, relying on businesses to provide basic services instead of an ineffective state further erodes civic trust and social contracts. Partnerships should focus on capacity building over substitution.
Thirdly, support concentrated on large firms could neglect less-politicised SMEs and workers requiring urgent assistance.[xliv] Engaging with smaller firms, particularly those operating in sectors such as agriculture, retail, and services, can provide several benefits in the context of peacebuilding efforts. First, SMEs are often more deeply embedded in local communities and have a better understanding of the specific needs and challenges faced by those communities. By working with these firms, peacebuilding initiatives can ensure that their interventions are more targeted and responsive to local realities. Second, SMEs are typically less politically connected than larger firms and may be more willing to engage in peacebuilding efforts without the baggage of vested interests or corruption. This can help to foster a more inclusive and transparent business environment, which is essential for building trust and promoting sustainable economic development. Supporting SMEs can also help to create jobs and stimulate economic activity at the grassroots level, which is critical for addressing the underlying drivers of conflict and promoting long-term stability. Balanced engagement across segments is needed. Additionally, sequencing priorities based on risk levels, focusing aid on transparent programmes with community buy-in, and pairing assistance with conditions could mitigate certain dangers of private sector peacebuilding efforts.
Conclusion
Strategically engaging Yemen’s private sector holds significant promise for complementing political solutions and fostering sustainable peace. By aligning the vested interests of businesses in stability with peacebuilding priorities, policymakers and development actors can harness the private sector’s resources and capacities to empower conflict-affected communities and drive economic revitalization.
However, realising this potential requires a nuanced understanding of the complex historical, political, and economic factors that have shaped Yemen’s private sector. The roots of the sector’s problems predate the current conflict, with elite capture, misaligned incentives, and weak institutions obstructing meaningful reforms. Engaging the private sector in peacebuilding efforts must therefore be grounded in a careful analysis of these underlying challenges and a pragmatic approach to navigating the interests of influential stakeholders.
Effective strategies for private sector engagement should focus on creating an enabling environment for businesses to contribute to peacebuilding while mitigating the risks of elite predation and unintended consequences. This can involve targeted incentives for businesses that actively support peace and development initiatives, coupled with transparency requirements and community oversight mechanisms. Prioritising support for small and medium-sized enterprises, particularly those in less politicised sectors, can help to foster a more inclusive and resilient economic recovery.
International actors, including UN agencies, multilateral organisations, and donors, have a critical role in supporting private sector engagement in peacebuilding. However, their efforts must be informed by a deep understanding of the local context and a willingness to adapt their approaches to the realities on the ground. Strengthening their capacity to provide targeted advice and support to businesses operating in conflict-affected areas will be essential for maximising the impact of their interventions.
Ultimately, the path to lasting peace and prosperity in Yemen will depend on the collective efforts of all stakeholders, including the government, civil society, and the private sector. By working together to harness the untapped potential of Yemen’s businesses and entrepreneurial spirit, these actors can lay the foundation for a more stable, inclusive, and resilient future. This will require a long-term commitment to addressing the underlying drivers of conflict, investing in human capital and infrastructure, and fostering a culture of dialogue, transparency, and accountability.
While the challenges are significant, the potential rewards are great. With careful planning, strategic partnerships, and a focus on local ownership and sustainability, private sector engagement in peacebuilding can help to transform Yemen’s economy and society, offering hope and opportunity to a population that has endured years of conflict and hardship. The international community must stand ready to support Yemen in this endeavour, leveraging its expertise, resources, and influence to help build a brighter future for all Yemenis.
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[xiv] Smulovitz, C. (1993). “Constitutionalism and democracy: Political uses of the past”.
[xv] Hill, G. (2017). Yemen Endures.
[xvi] Phillips, S. (2011). Yemen and the politics of permanent crisis. Routledge.
[xvii] AlMahdi, M., Alibrahim, M., Al Shawbkeh, M., & Asi, E. (2018). “Shaher Abdulhak’s tax havens violate international law”, Arab Reporters for Investigative Journalism (ARIJ), 21 May 2024, retrieved from: https://en.arij.net/investigation/shaher-abdulhaks-tax-havens-violate-international-law/.
[xviii] Shiban, B. (2016). “#PanamaPapers: Financing chaos in Yemen with ‘The Sugar Kings’”, The New Arab. Available at: [https://www.newarab.com/opinion/panamapapers-financing-chaos-yemen-sugar-kings.
[xix] Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., and Robinson, J. A. (2005). “Institutions as a fundamental cause of long-run growth,” Handbook of Economic Growth, 1, 385-472.
[xx] Phillips, S. (2011). Yemen and the politics of permanent crisis.
[xxi] Berman, N., Couttenier, M., Rohner, D., and Thoenig, M. (2017). “This mine is mine! How minerals fuel conflicts in Africa,” American Economic Review, 107(6), 1564-1610.
[xxii] Salisbury, P. (2018). “Yemen’s Southern Powder Keg”.
[xxiii] North, D. C., Wallis, J. J., Webb, S. B., and Weingast, B. R. (Eds.). (2013). In the shadow of violence: Politics, economics, and the problems of development, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
[xxiv] Muqbil, K. and Transfeld, M. (2019). “Status of the Abu al-Abbas Group in Taiz”, Yemen Policy Center, January 2019, retrieved from: https://www.yemenpolicy.org/the-status-of-abu-al-abbas-group/.
[xxv] Salisbury, P. (2018). “Yemen’s Southern Powder Keg”.
[xxvi] Smulovitz, C. (1993). “Constitutionalism and democracy: Political uses of the past”.
[xxvii] MacSweeney, N. (2008). Private sector development in post-conflict countries: A review of current literature and practice (Vol. 7584). Cambridge, UK: Donor Committee for Enterprise Development.
[xxviii] Ganson, B. and Wennmann, A. (2016). Business and conflict in fragile states: The case for pragmatic solutions. International Institute for Strategic Studies.
[xxix] Aall, P. R. (2000). “NGOs, conflict management and peacekeeping,” International Peacekeeping, 7(1), 121-141.
[xxx] MacSweeney, N. (2008). Private sector development in post-conflict countries: A review of current literature and practice (Vol. 7584). Cambridge, UK: Donor Committee for Enterprise Development.
[xxxi] Berman, N., Couttenier, M., Rohner, D., & Thoenig, M. (2017). “This mine is mine! How minerals fuel conflicts in Africa”.
[xxxii] Paffenholz, T. (2015). “Unpacking the local turn in peacebuilding: A critical assessment towards an agenda for future research,” Third World Quarterly, 36(5), 857-874.
[xxxiii] Killick, N., Srikantha, V. S., and Gündüz, C. (Eds.). (2005). The role of local business in peacebuilding (Vol. 4). International Alert.
[xxxiv] Aall, P. R. (2000). “NGOs, conflict management and peacekeeping”.
[xxxv] MacSweeney, N. (2008). Private sector development in post-conflict countries.
[xxxvi] Parks, T., Colletta, N., and Oppenheim, B. (2013). The contested corners of Asia: Subnational conflict and international development assistance-The case of Mindanao, Philippines, The Asia Foundation.
[xxxvii] Ganson, B., and Wennmann, A. (2016). Business and conflict in fragile states.
[xxxviii] The concept of “triangulation” in policy sciences refers to multi-pronged approaches utilising coordinated incentives, assistance mechanisms, and norm signalling together to enable possibilities that isolated efforts likely could not. This captures the pragmatic layering required amid limitations in Yemen while noting limitations on projecting linear outcomes in complex environments.
[xxxix] Barma, N. (2016). The Peacebuilding Puzzle: Political Order in Post-Conflict States, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
[xl] Berman, E., Shapiro, J. N., and Felter, J. H. (2011). “Can hearts and minds be bought? The economics of counterinsurgency in Iraq,” Journal of Political Economy, 119(4), 766-819.
[xli] Renders, M. and Terlinden, U. (2010). “Negotiating statehood in a hybrid political order: The case of Somaliland.” Development and Change, 41(4), 723-746.
[xlii] Levy, B. (2014). Working with the grain: Integrating governance and growth in development strategies. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
[xliii] Berman, N., Couttenier, M., Rohner, D., & Thoenig, M. (2017). “This mine is mine! How minerals fuel conflicts in Africa”.
[xliv] Ganson, B., & Wennmann, A. (2016). Business and conflict in fragile states.
