What the historic low turnout in Iran’s elections means

Third, the international dimension of Iran’s March elections is critical yet uncertain. Iranian people’s protests—both through street protests and abstention from the elections—send a strong signal to the international community, particularly Western governments, about the evolving political landscape in the country. The challenge for the West is to interpret these signals accurately and recalibrate its policies toward Iran accordingly.[xii] While Iranians lean toward a democratic transition, the West appears to be in a quandary about how to effectively engage with or influence the situation. The elections could be a watershed moment, prompting Western capitals to rethink their engagement strategies with Iran, moving beyond rhetoric toward instead implementing policies that would align with the aspirations of Iranian civil society. However, the precise nature of this recalibration and whether it will translate into meaningful policy changes on the ground, remains an open question.

Conclusion: Developments at the societal and élite levels

The recent elections have underscored two critical developments. First, the boycott campaign has led to the lowest voter turnout since the inception of the Islamic Republic. MP Mahmood Nabavian, who secured the position of MP in Tehran, received only around 597,000 votes, representing[xiii] merely 6% of the eligible voters in the city. This trend is consistent across other cities, where victorious candidates represent only 4% to 7% of the eligible population in their respective regions. Ham-Mihan, a reformist daily, interprets[xiv] this low turnout as a silent protest from individuals who choose not to engage in street demonstrations, expressing their dissent by abstaining from voting.

Second, despite the Guardian Council’s disqualification of numerous potential government critics, the election evolved into a contest among different factions of principalists, all aligned with the Islamic Republic’s center of power, i.e. Khamenei’s Office and IRGC. The primary list featured the incumbent parliamentary speaker, Mohammad Ghalibaf, alongside his allies, rooted in a coalition between centrist principalists and the Paydari Front, a more radical faction. However, other contenders affiliated with the Paydari Front, such as Amir-Hossein Sabeti and Hamid Rasaee (or Rasai), compiled their own lists and secured the second and third positions in Tehran, respectively. Ghalibaf was placed fourth with approximately 447,000 votes, a notable decline from his over one million votes and first-place finish in Tehran during the 2020 parliamentary elections. This outcome marks a considerable setback for him and his coalition, reflecting the shifting dynamics within Iran’s political landscape.

In fact, the success of the Paydari Front suggests that predominantly individuals with a radical ideological alignment with the Islamic Republic participated in the elections. Figures such as Nabavian, Sabeti, and Rasaee, known for their extremist stances—for example, rejecting negotiations with the West, sustaining enmity with the U.S., more ferociously implementing hijab laws, and restricting internet freedom—underscore this trend. The election of other members or candidates affiliated with the Paydari Front in Tehran and other major cities hints at a potentially significant shift. Meanwhile, Etemad, a reformist daily, posits that the widening gap between citizens and the government could foster radicalism.

However, it is critical to note that the Parliament’s role in Iran’s major policy decisions is relatively limited, as it often operates under the guidance of Iran’s real centers of power. For instance, in 2020, the current Parliament, now introduced as less hardline, endorsed a bill urging the Rouhani administration to adopt a nuclear escalation strategy, a move lauded by Khamenei, indicating his influence over parliamentary decisions. Therefore, predicting a shift toward a more hardline Parliament and significant policy changes may be premature. Instead, the more acute question revolves around how the Islamic Republic’s center of power will leverage Parliament to legitimize its strategies. With the current leadership hesitating to intensify domestic or international tensions and a heightened awareness of a legitimacy crisis due to another historically low voter turnout, a significant policy shift may pose risks to the Islamic Republic’s survival. According to Ahmad Zeyd-Abadi[xv], a reformist journalist, the Iranian leadership’s decisions are not heavily influenced by the Parliament’s composition; even if radical figures dominate. He notes that the predetermined policy shifts are likely to be implemented even if radical figures are not in the Parliament.

Thus, the recent election results should not be interpreted as a shift toward a new dichotomy within Iran’s political landscape, pitting centrist hardliners (or fundamentalists) against radical hardliners (or extremists). For years, many were willing to highlight a hardliner versus moderate antagonism, which was finally rejected by the Iranian people with the winter 2017/18 nationwide uprising.[xvi]

Indeed, decision-making is likely to remain predominantly under the control of the Supreme Leader, his Office, and the IRGC, with other institutions and individuals playing roles as demanded from them. In other words, at least for now, it is not probable that a more risk-taking of radical revolutionaries will take over the helm of the state, potentially making decisions that may ultimately jeopardize regime stability or even survival.