In the aftermath of the late June insurrection attempt by Wagner mercenaries in Moscow, swift action was taken by both Syrian authorities and Russian military leaders to prevent the spread of dissent.[i] Notably, the Syrian regime remained conspicuously silent.
A week later, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Vershinin arrived in Damascus, calling upon Syria’s al-Assad to firmly deal with Wagner’s rogue operatives.[ii] A statement from the Syrian presidency revealed that the two leaders discussed coordination between Syria and Russia, with a particular emphasis on recent events.[iii] Subsequently, the largely autonomous Wagner forces were directed to move to the Russian Hmeimim base in Latakia. Following this direction from Assad and Vershinin, the mercenaries complied.
The Wagner group, with military and economic stakes in Syria, could potentially influence Russian and Iranian interests in the conflict-ridden nation.
However, the Wagner group, with military and economic stakes in Syria, could potentially influence Russian and Iranian interests in the conflict-ridden nation. The strategic importance of Syria is underscored by the fact that the Russian Hmeimim base serves as the logistical hub for all Wagner’s overseas operations, including those in Africa. Over the years, the Wagner group has functioned as a security force throughout the Middle East and Africa, employing upwards of 30,000 combatants and is estimated to generate hundreds of millions of dollars, predominantly from African operations.[iv]
Wagner’s Economic Interests in Syria
The Wagner Group has significant interests in Syria’s oil and gas sectors, thanks to connections with the companies ‘Mercury’ and ‘Veiled’. These companies obtained oil exploration contracts in Syria through a presidential decree issued at the end of 2019.[v] They were granted exploration fields in the eastern and central regions north of the capital, Damascus.[vi]
In Syria, Wagner was recognised for its role in recapturing oil and gas fields from ISIS between 2016 and 2018.
As reported by the independent Russian newspaper Novaya Gazeta[vii], Mercury and Veiled are owned by Yevgeny Prigozhin. According to a report they published in early 2020, Prigozhin’s companies were earning approximately $20 million per month in Syria during 2018.[viii]
In Syria, Wagner was recognised for its role in recapturing oil and gas fields from ISIS between 2016 and 2018. After reclaiming these areas, the group secured them, especially in the countryside of Deir Ezzor, along with the phosphate fields in the Syrian desert.
In 2018, the Syrian General Petroleum Corporation entered into a contract with the Russian company Evropolis, stipulating that the company would earn 25% of the profits from recovered oil fields.[ix] This company was established just a few months before the contract was signed and served as a front for Wagner’s investment activities, according to a document obtained by the Wall Street Journal.
In April 2022, Russia provided two loans totalling $1 billion to the Syrian regime.
Links were later discovered between Capital and Evropolis, companies affiliated with Wagner. The CEO of the former was listed as a senior geologist in the latter, and other overlaps were found in the structures of the two companies in 2021.[x]
In April 2022, Russia provided two loans totalling $1 billion to the Syrian regime, conditional upon repayment to certain Russian companies, including Evropolis, affiliated with Wagner.
Prigozhin is likely to be compelled to transfer ownership after Putin identified himself as a partner in these companies. While Prigozhin had been the face of the companies, another entity will likely replace him following his fallout.
Will it increase Iran’s influence?
Although united in their support for Assad, Russia and Iran have found themselves fiercely at loggerheads within Syria since 2017. Their proxy forces underwent violent confrontations over Syria’s phosphate reserves in 2018 and 2019, with continued skirmishes over other strategic assets persisting ever since.[xi]
Currently, Wagner maintains a force of 1,000 to 2,000 troops in Syria, serving as a nexus for an extensive network of over 10,000 local private military contractors.[xii] Their main assignment is to protect Syria’s oil, gas, and phosphate infrastructure scattered across eastern Syria and the expansive desert terrain.[xiii]
Wagner compensates Syrian private military contractors partially through the income derived from the oil and phosphate infrastructure it operates in the country in addition to companies owned or managed by enterprises associated with a prominent confidant of Putin named Gennady Timchenko whose companies have become a major symbol of Russia’s growing economic and political sway in Syria.[xiv]
While Russia, as one of the world’s leading energy and commodities exporters, deems revenues from Syria’s natural resources as relatively trivial, they act as a crucial source of foreign currency for the Syrian regime. This endows Moscow with a strategic upper hand, enabling them to exert significant influence over Assad’s regime.
Wagner mercenaries, along with their contractor associates at oil and gas sites across Syria, form a crucial component of Russia's streamlined occupation strategy.
However, Russia’s decision to cut support to non-strategic proxies in 2021 prompted many to shift allegiance to Iran, a trend that amplified following Russia’s 2022 Ukraine invasion.[xv]
At present, Wagner mercenaries, along with their contractor associates at oil and gas sites across Syria, form a crucial component of Russia’s streamlined occupation strategy. Partially sustained by a stable and independent revenue stream, they have largely resisted Iran’s encroachments. Yet, any faltering of Russia’s key interests could potentially instigate a shift, with Wagner’s Syrian mercenaries reflecting the actions of past Russian proxies.
For example, in July 2022 when the National Defense Forces militias in eastern Deir Ezzor, under Hassan al-Ghadban’s leadership, severed ties with Moscow due to unpaid salaries for six months.[xvi] Shortly thereafter, the group integrated with the 4th Division, an elite unit backed by Iran and led by Maher al-Assad, brother of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, known to oversee Syria’s drug trade.
Having said this, the over 10,000 private local contractors with Wanger that protect the energy resources that are under the control of Assad are unlikely to be let go given that they are paid from the revenues of these energy products and their services are necessary to continue to protect and operates the fields.
Russia’s Influence to Persist
As a global powerhouse with nuclear capabilities and a UN veto right, Russia holds greater strategic value for the Assad regime than Iran does.
The influence of Russia in Syria is poised to endure, given the instability of Assad’s regime and its dependence on Russia to prevent further encroachments by Turkey and the potential for conflict escalation with Israel – a role Iran cannot fulfil. Despite Iran’s systematic and gradual efforts to undercut Russia’s sway within Syria’s military and state structures, Russia’s control over the nation’s key economic assets remains robust and is even expanding.
Moreover, as a global powerhouse with nuclear capabilities and a UN veto right, Russia holds greater strategic value for the Assad regime than Iran does. Therefore, Iran’s attempt to co-opt Russia’s leftover mercenaries may not necessarily bode well for Iran; being mercenaries, their loyalties could easily switch back to Russia or another entity. Moreover, while tensions persist and influence remains contested, Russia and Iran have been gradually delineating their roles, with Russia primarily exerting influence in political and economic domains, and Iran focusing on manpower, funding militias, and concentrating its presence in regions adjacent to the Iraqi border and in the southwest near Israel.
Iran's constrained political leverage often underscores the fragility of its strategy.
Furthermore, even in its attempts to sway the allegiances of pro-Assad militias, Iran’s constrained political leverage often underscores the fragility of its strategy. A pertinent example is seen in July 2021 when Iran sought to secure the loyalty of a militia associated with the pro-Assad National Defense Forces in the northeastern city of Qamishli, aiming to bolster its presence in the Kurdish-controlled region. Yet, when clashes erupted between the Iran-backed militia and Kurdish forces in Qamishli, Iran proved ineffective in offering either military or financial support to the group, as it faced strong resistance from the Kurdish forces within a Qamishli enclave. Instead, it was Russia that intervened, successfully brokering a resolution between the two parties.[xvii]
Assad’s own influence over the dynamic between Iran and Russia is often underestimated. Demonstrating political savvy, Assad retains a degree of control over shaping his regime and has recently gained additional leverage due to his accelerating diplomatic reconciliation with the Arab League states. For instance, in 2021, Assad discreetly reshuffled high-ranking positions within his military and intelligence agencies in a strategic bid to strengthen his rule, consolidate his regime, and mitigate the risk of a coup from Russia or Iran.[xviii] Assad is clearly cognizant of Iran’s growing influence and has been making subtle moves to counter it.
In conclusion, whether it’s Russia’s base on the Mediterranean, the agreement brokered with southern rebels, or recent developments with Turkey-backed northern rebels, Russia remains Assad’s most important ally. Regardless of the fate of the Wagner forces in Syria, Russia’s role is likely to remain paramount, while Assad continues to manoeuvre strategically to ensure his regime doesn’t become a puppet to either power.
[i] Reuters. (2023). Syria brought Wagner Group fighters to heel before mutiny unfolded – Russia. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/syria-brought-wagner-group-fighters-heel-mutiny-unfolded-russia-2023-07-07/
[ii] Sauer, P., & Ballhaus, R. (2023). Putin Moves to Seize Control of Wagner’s Global Empire. The Wall Street Journal. https://www.wsj.com/articles/putin-moves-to-seize-control-of-wagners-global-empire-26d49286
[iii] Syrian Presidency. (2023). Facebook. https://www.facebook.com/SyrianPresidency/posts/pfbid0LxawDWjap4nEo1owDYzsbgZzrJGq4qfDK8437dVaMFQSgxWzzSqvULfgJRXKbgBpl
[iv] Al Jazeera Mubasher. (2023). حرب ونفط وذهب… تفاصيل عمليات مجموعة “واغنر” العسكرية والأمنية الروسية في مختلف مناطق النفوذ. Al Jazeera Mubasher. https://www.aljazeeramubasher.net/news/2023/6/30/%D8%AD%D8%B1%D8%A8-%D9%88%D9%86%D9%81%D8%B7-%D9%88%D8%B0%D9%87%D8%A8-%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B5%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B9%D8%A9
[v] Enab Baladi. (2023). What is the fate of “Wagner” companies in Syria
للمزيد. Enab Baladi. https://www.enabbaladi.net/archives/648495
[vi] Enab Baladi. (2023). What is the fate of “Wagner” companies in Syria
للمزيد. Enab Baladi. https://www.enabbaladi.net/archives/648495
[vii] Shayakhmetova, L. (2020). Вагнер. Первая нефть. Novaya Gazeta. https://novayagazeta.ru/articles/2020/01/19/83514-vagner-pervaya-neft
[viii] Shayakhmetova, L. (2020). Вагнер. Первая нефть. Novaya Gazeta. https://novayagazeta.ru/articles/2020/01/19/83514-vagner-pervaya-neft
[ix] Wall Street Journal (2023). Wall Street Journal https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/russia-wagner-prigozhin-putin/card/inside-wagner-russia-s-secret-war-company-gPzjG25l5vIYHemKDAFG?mod=Searchresults_pos4&page=1
[x] Cafarella, J. (2021). Putin’s Shadow Warriors Stake Their Claim in Syria. Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/05/17/putin-shadow-warriors-stake-claim-syria-oil-energy-wagner-prigozhin-libya-middle-east/
[xi] Syria TV. (2023). Indications of the military confrontations between Russia and Iran in Deir Ezzor and Aleppo. Syria TV. https://www.syria.tv/%D8%AF%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AC%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B3%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D9%88%D8%A5%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B2%D9%88%D8%B1-%D9%88%D8%AD%D9%84%D8%A8
[xii] Isaakyan, I. (2023). Putin Moves to Seize Control of Wagner’s Global Empire. Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/07/05/putin-russia-wagner-mutiny-syria-iran/
[xiii] Isaakyan, I. (2023). Putin Moves to Seize Control of Wagner’s Global Empire. Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/07/05/putin-russia-wagner-mutiny-syria-iran/
[xiv] OCCRIP. (2022). A ‘Bloody’ Trade: Inside the Murky Supply Chain Bringing Syrian Phosphates Into Europe. OCCRP. https://www.occrp.org/en/investigations/a-bloody-trade-inside-the-murky-supply-chain-bringing-syrian-phosphates-into-europe
[xv] Al Arabi Al Jadeed. (2022). Escalation in northern Syria and Iranian militias expanding their influence. Al Arabi Al Jadeed. https://www.alaraby.co.uk/politics/%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%B9%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%B4%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B3%D8%B9-%D9%86%D9%81%D9%88%D8%B0%D9%87%D8%A7
[xvi]Hassan, M. and al-Ahmed, S. (2021). Iran’s loss in Qamishli’s Tayy neighborhood results in a shift in the boundaries of control. Middle East Institute. https://eyeofeuphrates.com/ar/news/2022/04/17/4887
[xvii] Hassan, M. and al-Ahmed, A. (2021). Iran’s Loss is Qamishli’s Tayy Neighbourhood Results in a Shift in the Boundaries of Control. Middle East Institute. https://www.mei.edu/publications/irans-loss-qamishlis-tayy-neighborhood-results-shift-boundaries-control
[xviii] Karlin, M. (2021). Al-Assad’s Strategy to Avoid Becoming a Puppet of Russia and Iran. Newlines Institute. https://newlinesinstitute.org/syria/al-assads-strategy-to-avoid-becoming-a-puppet-of-russia-and-iran/
