Ever since the 1990s and the breakup of the Soviet Union, Georgia and Syria have had unusual diplomatic relations. The two countries did not reopen their embassies at the time – instead, liaising through a representative office of the Syrian ambassador in Yerevan, the capital of Armenia, and the Georgian ambassador in Cairo, Egypt.
Although Damascus’ relations with Tbilisi were not at a high level compared to those between Syria and Armenia and even Azerbaijan, Syria’s foreign policy towards Georgia espoused a balanced approach, not influenced by Georgia’s seesaw relations with Russia and the West.
As Russia kicked off its war against Georgia in the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in August 2008, Syria’s stance was a clear example of this approach. Firstly, during his visit to Moscow, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad accused the United States of applying double standards toward the two breakaway territories, stating that the West is ignoring the rights of the people of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In case Georgia initiated the war, Russia’s stance was entirely appropriate, Assad claimed at the time in a clear nod of support for the Kremlin.[i]
But on the other hand, Syria did not go beyond vocal criticism and did not recognise the independence of the two, unlike Russia, Nicaragua, and Nauru, who did so by the end of 2009.
Teetering towards imbalance
Damascus’ balancing act towards Georgia gradually changed after the start of the Syrian civil war in March 2011. Contrary to Turkey’s essential role in a skewed approach of Syria’s foreign policy towards Azerbaijan and Armenia, Russia played a key role in Damascus’ views on Georgia.
First, in 2013, Abkhazia appointed a representative of the so-called Abkhaz Foreign Ministry to Syria, leading to a first informal contact between Syrian representatives and the Abkhaz side in December 2015 in Moscow. Abkhazia’s de-facto Foreign Minister Viacheslav Chirikba and Syrian Ambassador to Russia Riad Haddad met in Moscow in 2015 to discuss “bilateral” relations.
Chirikba subsequently stated that “there was a strong desire on both sides to strengthen and expand Syrian-Abkhaz relations. Will Syria eventually recognize Abkhazia [independence] as a result? I believe anything is possible, but this is a sovereign Syrian decision”.[ii]
In November 2016, residents of Abkhazia took to the streets in Sukhumi, holding Syrian flags and banners in Arabic and Russian to show their support and solidarity with the people of Syria. Then-President Raul Khajimba addressed participants of the rally pledging unequivocal support to “the brotherly people of Syria” in their fight for “peace against terrorism”.[iii]
In the meantime, Damascus showed a similar pro-Russian sentiment in its approach to Ukraine. In November 2016, Syria became the sixth nation to officially recognise the Russian Federation’s unilateral annexation of Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula – a move deemed illegal by the West – right after Cuba, Nicaragua, Venezuela, Afghanistan and North Korea.[iv]
Meanwhile, as a sign of further ties between Syria and Abkhazia, in December 2016 Sukhumi hosted the first freestyle wrestling tournament for national teams of the two. Earlier that year, the first batch of humanitarian aid – 12 tonnes of mineral water Kodor – was shipped to Syria from the Abkhaz Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Repatriation Committee and with the support of the Russian Ministry of Defence.[v]
This rapprochement culminated in November 2017 with the signing of a free trade agreement between Damascus and Sukhumi, paving the way for the possibility of recognition the following year.[vi] Syria’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs released an official statement in May 2018, regarding the recognition of occupied Georgian regions[vii]. That is how Syria became the fifth country after Russia, Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Nauru that recognised the independence of two breakaway Georgian regions. Abkhazian and South Ossetian regimes praised the decision at the time.[viii] In response to these developments, Georgia immediately severed diplomatic ties with Syria.[ix]
Expanding Syria’s relations with Georgia’s breakaway territories
Following the recognition, the two parastates went on a slew of official trips and inaugurated embassies in Syria, best illustrated by Abkhazia’s Khajimba and his visit to Damascus in 2018.
During Khajimba’s trip, al-Assad awarded him the Umayyad Order, which is the highest honour granted by the Syrian Arab Republic, while in exchange Khajimba bestowed upon al-Assad the Apzha Order of the First Degree, the highest Abkhazian honour, signing a partnership pact in the process.[x]
The two sides continued with a series of visits, signing another memorandum of understanding in the “field of political consultations” in 2022.[xi]
Return of the Abkhazian diaspora
It seems that the Syrian government granted formal recognition to the Georgian separatist regions as a gesture of gratitude to Russia for its efforts against Assad regime opponents.
In the meantime, the return of the Abkhazian diaspora from Syria became a key point in the relations between the two, similarly to the Syrian Armenian diaspora community’s homecoming.
In a historical twist of irony, the Abkhaz community in Syria harks back to Tsarist Russia’s 19th-century campaign to conquer the North Caucasus, which drove millions of Abkhaz and other natives of the region into Turkey, Syria and other parts of the former Ottoman Empire.
At the outbreak of civil war in Syria, Abkhazia began their repatriation campaign.[xii] In this regard, Khajimba believed that “thousands of Abkhazians were forced to leave their homeland at the end of the nineteenth century. Today, those refugees’ descendants have a constitutional right to return home”.[xiii]
His comment at the time can be read as an explanation for the move, understood as an attempt to increase its population to strengthen its claim to independence, which would also explain why Abkhazia opened an embassy in Damascus faster than South Ossetia.
As for Assad’s motivations, it seems that the Syrian government granted formal recognition to the Georgian separatist regions as a gesture of gratitude to Russia for its efforts against Assad regime opponents. Tbilisi has long accused Moscow of luring allies to recognise the two Russia-backed parastates in exchange for military, economic and diplomatic aid. However, Damascus’s decision to do so demonstrates Moscow’s nearly unrivalled influence over Syria compared to Russia’s other strategic partners. Moscow has pleaded with Belarus, Armenia, China and North Korea for years to establish diplomatic relations with the separatist Georgian territories — yet, without success.[xiv]
The Kremlin-oriented and unbalanced approach to Syria’s foreign policy did not end there. In June 2022, after the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Damascus also recognised the independence of the Moscow-occupied so-called Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics (DPR, LPR). Following this decision, the Ukrainian government severed diplomatic ties with Syria like Georgia.
Fall of Assad: Are changes coming?
If political conditions in Georgia stabilise, however, Tbilisi is expected to normalise relations with Syria.
However, it seems that after the sudden fall of the Assad regime on 8 December 2024, these conditions are gradually changing and many foreign policy approaches will now be revised.
In a major development, a senior Ukrainian delegation led by Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha met with Syria’s de facto leader, and head of the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), Ahmed Hussein al-Shara, formerly known as Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, in Damascus in late December.[xv]
The visit was followed by Azerbaijan’s Deputy Foreign Minister Yalchin Rafiyev’s, who met with Syria’s new Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani. In turn, this means that after 12 years, the Azerbaijani embassy will resume operations in Syria.[xvi]
But the fall of Assad’s regime happened at a time when Georgia was involved in a political crisis after the 26 October parliamentary elections and the election of a new president on 14 December.
If political conditions in Georgia stabilise, however, Tbilisi is expected to normalise relations with Syria, just like Ukraine. An important precondition of this process will be withdrawing the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by the new Syrian government, an important step in leaving Syria’s Russia-slanted foreign policy in the South Caucasus.
In turn, this could lead to the closing of the Abkhazia office in Damascus, a halt to the return of its diaspora from Syria, and the reopening of the Syrian and Georgian embassies in their respective capitals.
Finally, with the development of economic and commercial relations, we might also witness the return of Syrian students to Georgian universities who were forced to leave Georgia after the termination of relations between Tbilisi and Damascus.
[i] “West is distorting facts in Georgia: Syria’s Assad”, Al Arabia, 20 August 2008, retrieved from: https://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2008%2F08%2F20%2F55132.
[ii] Trippe, C. (2015). “Annexing Abkhazia”, DW, 15 October 2015, retrieved from: Annexing Abkhazia – DW – 10/15/2015.
[iii] Tkhelidze, S. “Abkhazia: Looking forward to Syrian recognition”, The Eastern Europe, 4 December 2017, retrieved from: https://neweasterneurope.eu/2017/12/04/abkhazia-looking-forward-syrian-recognition/..
[iv] Kaleji, V. (2022). “Syrian foreign policy in the Caucasus and Ukraine: An unbalanced, Russia-centered approach”, Middle East Institute, 23 August 23 2022, retrieved from: https://www.mei.edu/publications/syrian-foreign-policy-caucasus-and-ukraine-unbalanced-russia-centered-approach..
[v] Tkhelidze, Op. Cit. Tkhelidze, Op. Cit.
[vi] Lambert, M. (2021). “Relations between Abkhazia and Syria: Towards a Domino Effect with Belarus and North Korea?”, The Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC), 23 June 2021, retrieved from: https://russiancouncil.ru/en/blogs/mlambert/relations-between-abkhazia-and-syria-towards-a-domino-effect-with-bela/..
[vii] “Syria recognizes independence of Georgia’s occupied Abkhazia and South Ossetia”, Agenda. GE, 29 May 2018. retrieved from: https://agenda.ge/en/news/2018/1151.
[viii] “Georgia cuts diplomatic relations with Syria after it recognizes Abkhazia and South Ossetia”, OC Media, 29 May 2018. retrieved from: https://oc-media.org/georgia-cuts-diplomatic-relations-with-syria-after-it-recognises-abkhazia-and-ossetia/.
[ix] “Syria recognizes independence of Georgia’s occupied Abkhazia and South Ossetia”, Agenda. GE, 29 May 2018, retrieved from: https://agenda.ge/en/news/2018/1151..
[x] “President Al-Assad receives Abkhazian President, the visit is cornerstone to enhance bilateral relations”, Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA), 4 September 2018, retrieved from: https://sana.sy/en/?p=146118..
[xi] “Syrian Foreign Minister Visiting Abkhazia”, Civil Ge, 25 August, 2022. retrieved from: https://civil.ge/archives/505990.
[xii] Lomsadze, G. (2018). “Syria formally recognizes Abkhazia and South Ossetia”, Eurasianet, 29 May 2018, retrieved from: https://eurasianet.org/syria-formally-recognizes-abkhazia-and-south-ossetia..
[xiii] “Syrians build new lives in post-conflict Abkhazia”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Abkhazia, 22 December 2017, retrieved from: https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2017/10/22/syrians-build-new-lives-in-post-conflict-abkhazia..
[xiv] Vali Kaleji, Op. Cit.
[xv] “Syria’s de facto leader Sharaa meets Ukrainian foreign minister in Damascus”, France 24, 30 December 2024, retrieved from: https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20241230-syria-s-de-facto-leader-sharaa-meets-ukrainian-foreign-minister-in-damascus..
[xvi] Calli, M.E. (2024). “Azerbaijan’s deputy foreign minister meets with Syria’s new foreign minister in Damascus”, Anadolu Agency, 29 December 2024, retrieved from: https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/azerbaijans-deputy-foreign-minister-meets-with-syrias-new-foreign-minister-in-damascus/3437541.
